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585 
A Name I Call Myself:  
Creativity and Naming 
Laura A. Heymann* 
In recent years, various disputes involving the use of creative works 
have demonstrated how trademark-related concerns lurk at the heart of 
what are ostensibly copyright-related claims. When recording artists such 
as Jackson Browne or the members of Heart object to the unauthorized 
use of their songs in connection with a political campaign, they are most 
likely not troubled about the loss of revenue resulting from the use; rather, 
they are likely concerned that the public will wrongly assume that the use 
of the song indicates that they have endorsed the political candidate. But 
because it is sometimes easier for them to bring a successful copyright claim 
than a false endorsement claim, we risk an overbroad result: an injunction 
against the use of the work altogether, despite its expressive benefits, rather 
than a narrower injunction requiring a disclaimer or similar information-
correcting device.  
Naming practices can, on occasion, illustrate the reverse 
trademark/copyright divide: disputes that more naturally fit a trademark-
related framework but that actually embody copyright-related concerns. For 
example, innumerable advice columns have featured some variation of the 
following question: “We chose a lovely, original name for our soon-to-be 
born baby and told my sister-in-law about it. Now she has named her 
child, born last week, the exact same name. I can’t believe she stole our 
baby name. Should I ever speak to her again?” Although naming is 
typically seen as trademark-related, part (or all) of what causes this 
anguish is a copyright-related concern: the creativity that went into 
choosing, finding, or inventing the name and, relatedly, a desire to be 
recognized for that creativity. 
 
* Class of 2014 Professor of Law, College of William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. Many 
thanks to Michael Adams, Mark Badger, Eric Goldman, Justin Hughes, Greg Lastowka, Mark Lemley, 
Mark McKenna, Brent Nicholas, Zahr Said, Michal Shur-Ofry, Jessica Silbey, David Simon, Eva 
Subotnik, Peter Swire, John Tehranian, Rebecca Tushnet, and the participants in the “Governing the 
Magic Circle: Regulation of Virtual Worlds” symposium at the UC Irvine School of Law, for which 
this piece was written, and the 2011 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference. Thanks also to John 
Alford, Patrick Berry, and Stefan Oehrlein for research assistance and to the staff of the UC Irvine Law 
Review. One of the risks of writing about online environments is the speed at which they change. The 
citations in this Article were accurate as of March 29, 2012, but may have since become outdated. 
UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2012  2:14 PM 
586 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:585 
 
Social networks, virtual worlds, and other forms of electronic 
interaction that require users to choose identifiers to facilitate 
communicative exchanges offer interesting environments in which to 
consider this intersection of trademark and copyright interests. If users 
select names as much for their expressive power as for their functional 
ability to distinguish one user from another, as they appear to do, what 
does that tell us about the kinds of creativity that matter to noncommercial 
creators? From where do some participants get the idea that names can be 
owned and, therefore, “stolen”? And what, then, do these instincts tell us 
about the interests and rhetoric that are typically invoked in discussions of 
intellectual property law? 
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Proper names are poetry in the raw. Like all poetry, they are untranslatable. 
 —W.H. Auden1 
INTRODUCTION 
Readers of advice columns have no doubt at least once come across 
something like the following (hypothetical) missive: “We chose a lovely, original 
name for our soon-to-be born baby and told my sister-in-law about it. Now she 
has named her child, born last week, exactly the same name. I can’t believe she 
stole our baby name. Should I ever speak to her again?”2 
 
1. W.H. Auden, Names, Proper, in A CERTAIN WORLD 267, 267 (1970); cf. John Colapinto, 
Famous Names, NEW YORKER, Oct. 3, 2011, at 38, 39 (discussing naming consultant David Placek’s 
view that “the best brand names, like poems, work by compressing into a single euphonious word an 
array of specific, resonant meanings and associations,” but noting that Placek’s clients are typically 
more concerned with effectiveness than art). 
2. See, e.g., Gail Saltz, My Sister-in-Law Stole My Baby Name! What to Do If Someone Wants to Use the 
Same Moniker for Their Child, TODAY (Mar. 21, 2007, 5:38 PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
17724692/ns/today-relationships/t/my-sister-in-law-stole-my-baby-name. The scenario is common 
enough to have been mentioned in an episode of Sex and the City and an episode of Seinfeld. See Sex 
and the City: The Baby Shower (HBO television broadcast Aug. 9, 1998) (depicting Charlotte complaining 
about a childhood friend who “stole [the] baby name” that she invented when she was eleven years 
old); Seinfeld: The Seven (NBC television broadcast Feb. 1, 1996) (depicting George’s outrage when his 
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The selection or invention of a name for one’s child—or one’s pet, product, 
or avatar—is frequently associated with such property-related rhetoric. It should 
not be surprising in a society where naming rights for buildings go for millions of 
dollars3 that one’s name is thought of as property and thus as something that 
might be bought, sold, or stolen.4 Marketers of consumer data have accustomed 
us to the notion of names as the subject of commerce, a position some online 
environments anticipate when they explicitly restrict the sale of usernames.5 Our 
continuing (and unfortunate) awareness of the crime commonly known as identity 
theft has also trained us to think of the indicia used to identify ourselves in society, 
including our names, as things that can be owned. And various literary metaphors 
invoke the concept of one’s name as the hook on which reputation hangs; when 
one’s reputation is besmirched, it is one’s name that is seen as damaged or pilfered 
goods.6 
When parents or parents-to-be complain of someone having “stolen” the 
name they have chosen for their baby, this property rhetoric is not likely to have 
been driven by legal concerns. Indeed, the law has a particularly utilitarian view of 
names as property. Names have value in the law largely as a result of their 
denotative function—that is, their ability to identify an individual or entity. Thus, 
the use of a name is unlawful when that use confuses or misleads consumers (as in 
trademark law’s prohibition of the use of another’s trademark to cause confusion 
as to source), or when the name is used to obtain an unauthorized economic 
benefit (as in a false endorsement case, identity theft, or a violation of the right of 
publicity). The same is true in environments governed by contract rather than by 
tort, such as terms of service on social networking sites that prohibit 
impersonation of other users. These concerns are not likely to be relevant to the 
 
girlfriend reveals the name for his future first-born child to her cousin, leading the cousin to give it to 
her child: “It’s my name. I made it up. You can’t just steal it.”). 
3. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Naming Rights and the Physical Public Domain, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
919, 926–29 (2007); Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 
GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2007). 
4. Courts’ rhetoric occasionally contributes to this notion. See, e.g., Perfection Mfg. Co. v. B. 
Coleman Silver’s Co., 270 F. 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1921) (referring to the “business parasite” who “first 
steals another’s name, then his business, and finally attempts to deceive the retail trade”); Pump, Inc. 
v. Collins Mgmt., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 1159, 1166 (D. Mass. 1990) (“A world-famous group such as 
Aerosmith, enjoying a strong base of loyal teenage support, would have absolutely no reason for 
stealing the name of an unknown band to sell its records. Indeed, such action would be irrational.”). 
5. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (affirming 
the dismissal of a misappropriation claim based on the rental of cardholder information for marketing 
purposes, noting that the value came from defendants’ aggregation of names on the list); The Twitter 
Rules, TWITTER HELP CENTER, http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2012) (noting that selling usernames is prohibited). 
6. The usual citation is to Othello : “Who steals my purse steals trash; ’tis something, nothing; / 
’Twas mine, ’tis his, and has been slave to thousands; / But he that filches from me my good name / 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, / And makes me poor indeed.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
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hypothetical letter writer, as she is not worried that someone will use her chosen 
baby name to commit fraud, reap a commercial benefit, or ruin her child’s 
reputation, nor is she likely concerned that some future third-grade teacher will be 
unable to tell the two children apart. Indeed, in some instances, the child has yet 
to be born; the naming announcement is intention but not yet action. 
Rather, the parent sees her chosen baby name as property in a Lockean 
sense, in that she views naming as a creative activity that leads to ownership.7 
“Stealing” in this scenario relates not to economic interests or to issues of fraud or 
deceit but to dignitary interests: the idea that products of creative expression 
“belong” to their creator and so should not be copied within a particular 
community without either permission or attribution. This is a belief that is likely 
shared by creators in many fields, even as commentators debate whether such 
property metaphors are useful in discussing copyright infringement.8 Some of 
these creators may indeed view their work as property in the economic sense: they 
expect at some point to receive remuneration for their efforts and so experience 
the harm that comes from copying as economic injury. But even creators who are 
motivated to create by intrinsic rewards may still view their works through a 
property lens. Part of this feeling might be explained by the fact that they work in 
the shadow of the law. Because U.S. copyright law affords all qualifying authors 
legal rights in their work, so long as that work surmounts relatively low hurdles of 
originality and fixation,9 authors who declare that others may use their work 
without cost so long as it is attributed gain the authority to do so from the 
ownership of the work that copyright law provides. But even where such creators 
are not influenced by their legal rights, the same Lockean sense of their creative 
efforts as something that belongs to them is likely to engender talk of dignitary 
transgressions in property-related terms: that someone has copied or altered work 
that is “mine.” When an author seeks attribution for her work, after all, she is 
seeking a public acknowledgment that the work belongs to her in some sense. 
Indeed, the act of naming may feel, to some, as if it involves much the same 
sort of creative process that, for others, attends writing a poem or composing a 
 
7. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ch. 5, § 27 (Peter Laslett ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“Whatsoever then [man] removes out of the State that Nature 
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his 
own, and thereby makes it his Property.”). 
8. Many commentators have noted that in the context of nonrivalrous goods, the notions of 
“theft” and “stealing” may be inapt. See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, When Stealing Isn’t Stealing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 28, 2012, at A27. Regardless of the vocabulary used, however, such goods are often discussed in 
terms of ownership, control, and transgression. See id. (suggesting that concepts such as 
“unauthorized use, trespass, conversion and misappropriation” would be more appropriate 
terminology). 
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) 
(“Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by 
the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity.”). 
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song: thoughtfulness about the message that the choice of name will 
communicate; the incorporation of cultural and other references; decisions about 
rhythm, meter, spelling, and other prosodic elements; and the purposeful claiming 
of that act of creation as one’s own.10 Even when a name is appropriated rather 
than invented—a child named for a favorite literary character, for example11—
some no doubt believe that this process involves creative activity because the use 
of the name in a new context transforms the name’s meaning into something 
more personal, even as it involves its own act of copying.12 The woman who 
names her daughter Lisbeth after the heroine of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo,13 
for example, likely does so because the character or the story means something to 
her. When her sister-in-law hears of this choice and decides to adopt the name for 
her own child, she is seen as devaluing the creative expression inherent in the 
initial choice by avoiding the effort required to come up with a similarly 
meaningful name on her own.14 For those who may not otherwise see themselves 
as authors or artists, then, the process of naming is a small way of giving form to 
one’s creative impulses. It should therefore not be surprising that those who 
engage in naming feel a sense of both authorship and ownership over the product 
of this process, in a Lockean sense, and view the act of deliberate duplication of 
the name as a social, if not legal, transgression. 
Because the law does not tend to treat names as products of creative 
expression (U.S. copyright law, for example, generally denies protection to names 
 
10. I do not mean to suggest by this that all types of creative activity should be assessed or 
valued equally; rather, I contend that different individuals will express creative impulses in different 
ways, some more prominently than others. Cf. James C. Kaufman & Ronald A. Beghetto, Beyond Big 
and Little: The Four C Model of Creativity, 13 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 1 (2009) (proposing a model of 
creativity ranging from “mini-c” creativity to “Big-C” creativity). Of course, this raises the question of 
what it means to be creative, a task too enormous for me to tackle here. Recent forays in the 
intellectual property literature include Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1441 (2010), and Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1151 (2007). Thanks to David Simon for pointing me to Kaufman and Beghetto’s work. 
11. One study concludes that most baby names in the United States are copied rather than 
invented. Matthew W. Hahn & R. Alexander Bentley, Drift as a Mechanism for Cultural Change: An 
Example from Baby Names, 270 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B.: BIOLOGY LETTERS 120 (2003). 
12. Cf., e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How 
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (discussing how nontransformative copying can serve free 
speech interests). 
13. Lisbeth Salander is the main character in Swedish author Stieg Larsson’s Millennium 
series, the first novel of which was published in 2008 under the English title The Girl with the Dragon 
Tattoo. 
14. At the same time, the sister-in-law might likewise claim that forbidding her from using the 
name of her choice would infringe on her autonomy and personhood. Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 
YALE L.J. 1533, 1544 (1993) (considering “a basic question at the heart of Lockean natural law: what 
happens when a conflict arises between fundamental entitlements of the public, and the moral claims 
that a creative laborer possesses by virtue of having created an intellectual product?”). 
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on the grounds that names do not exhibit the required amount of creativity15), 
only creators who have rights in a copyrightable work with which a name is 
associated can use the law to vindicate interests in the name itself that arise from 
the creator’s perception of the name as a creative work.16 This is not to say that 
the law fails to engage with the creative impulse in naming altogether. Courts have 
considered the name of a fictional character, for example, in determining whether 
that character is sufficiently delineated to be copyrightable as opposed to being 
merely a stock figure.17 Trademark doctrine suggests that more inventive 
trademarks are stronger marks entitled to more protection, while section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act allows the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to refuse 
registration to names with particular connotations, such as names deemed 
“immoral” or “scandalous.”18 And although its impact has been blunted by later 
election law cases, the Supreme Court’s decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission,19 holding that the plaintiff had a First Amendment right to distribute 
handbills under the pseudonym “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers,” evidences 
recognition of the importance of expressing oneself creatively through naming, 
even if the chosen name obscures one’s “true” identity. But the law’s utilitarian 
focus on naming’s denotative function means that individuals and entities that 
experience others’ use of a name as an expression-related harm (rather than as, 
say, fraud) must typically turn to extralegal regimes for vindication. 
As various scholars have discussed, norms and other means of enforcement 
within a particular community can reinforce values that are important to the 
community without the need for more formal legal proceedings. An ever-growing 
 
15. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (noting various works not subject to copyright, including 
“[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere 
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or 
contents”). 
16. Cf., e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871, 882 (2007) 
(“Moral rights are aimed at preserving an author’s artistic autonomy and dignity; copyrights afford 
economic protection and are steeped in a utilitarian framework.”). The exception in U.S. copyright 
law is the Visual Artists Rights Act, which provides limited moral rights–like protection for certain 
works of visual art. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003) (rejecting attempt to use Lanham Act to vindicate attribution interest); cf. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959–61, 1014–15 (1982) 
(describing the types of personal property bound up with personhood and advocating legal protection 
as against competing property claims not tied to personhood). 
17. See infra notes 95–98 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 69–77 and accompanying text; see also Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a) (2006). The latter phenomenon also appears in various online environments’ terms of 
service, as well in state court decisions denying name change petitions. See, e.g., Terms of Service, 
SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php (last updated Dec. 15, 2010) (prohibiting 
account names that are “vulgar, offensive, or otherwise inappropriate”). One difference between the 
two systems is that the Patent and Trademark Office’s refusal to register a trademark does not 
prevent the putative registrant from using the mark in commerce, whereas an online network’s refusal 
to allow a certain username to be registered does prevent its use on that network. 
19. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995). 
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group of intellectual property scholars have considered what is typically called “IP 
without IP” or “IP’s negative space”—realms in which creativity apparently 
flourishes without intellectual property protection but with the constraint 
provided by community norms or regulation.20 It is in such realms that the 
creative interests arising from a view of names as property are recognized and 
adjudicated. For example, as David Fagundes has entertainingly demonstrated, the 
roller derby community places a high value on creativity in naming, such that it 
formally prohibits duplication of roller derby names even when there is little risk 
that audience members will confuse two skaters using the same name.21 The letter 
writer whose sister-in-law “stole her baby name,” by contrast, is working within 
less formal, but no less deeply felt, community norms—namely, that within certain 
trust-based relationships, one does not duplicate another’s naming efforts without 
permission. In both cases, there is a copyright-like interest, but not the economic 
one that is traditionally assumed to incentivize authors. Rather, the interest—if not 
a pure incentive—is twofold: preventing duplication and, thereby, inviting 
recognition of one’s authorial efforts. 
These two interests—uniqueness and recognition—are closely connected. 
To begin with, naming is, quite obviously, related to issues of personality. When 
we name ourselves (as in a social network) or name others, we are not only 
making reference possible but also engaging in an act of identity creation. As a 
result, we are apt to choose or invent names that serve not only as a reference but 
also as a way of communicating some quality or characteristic about ourselves or 
the people or things we are naming. Additionally, and relatedly, this act of naming 
and communicating carries with it a desire for recognition of the creativity 
inherent in the naming process. The letter writer in the advice column is likely 
motivated not only by the desire to name her child something personal and 
individual but also by the desire to be recognized for that choice. If she were 
simply trying to avoid the plethora of Emilys and Daniels in the kindergarten class 
by choosing Rosetta or Ethelred, she might be concerned that her sister-in-law’s 
copying represents the camel’s nose in the tent, and that her unique child might 
now be less special. But she also likely wanted to prevent her sister-in-law from 
taking credit when others said, “What a beautiful name! How did you come up 
 
20. Some early forays include Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of Sauces: 
Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1121 (2007); 
Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property Systems: The Case of French 
Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2008); Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): 
The Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 
(2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in 
Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). For commentary on this scholarship, see, for example, 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?: Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual 
Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative 
Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317 (2011). 
21. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Emergent Property Norms Governing Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1111, 1123–24 (2012). 
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with it?” The concern for credit, in this instance as in many others, is so closely 
tied with creativity as to be nearly inseparable. The impulse to say “I did this” 
evolves, I think, quite naturally into “This is mine”—hence the belief that the 
baby’s name was the letter writer’s “property” to begin with.22 
Both the desire to communicate via the choice of a name and the feeling of 
transgression when that creative act is dishonored depend on the presence of a 
community. If one indeed intends to engage in creative expression through 
naming, one’s audience must be expected to understand or appreciate the effort. 
Likewise, one is more apt to feel as if a name has been “stolen” if the perpetrator 
is a member of one’s community, however defined, rather than a stranger. The 
participant in an online community whose username pays homage to Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer is more likely to care if another member of that online community 
adopts the same username as opposed to a participant in another, unrelated 
community. Thus, the property-like approach to names in these situations both 
gives rise to and is reinforced by norms in those communities that see names as 
works of authorship and experience copying of those works as moral rights–like 
harms. 
We now have many more ways in which to engage in and observe this kind 
of creativity than ever before. Our online naming opportunities, including e-mail 
addresses, social networking sites, blog writing and commenting, and virtual 
worlds such as Second Life and World of Warcraft, all encourage us, by offering 
limited space for our expressive impulses, to demonstrate that brevity is indeed 
the soul of wit.23 Because we are attaching names to online identities that are both 
ourselves and not ourselves, we can experience naming both as claiming and as 
identity creation. We can participate only once, using the same screen name in 
each online interaction, or change our names with each forum or over time, 
 
22. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 31 (2011) (demonstrating that authors who maintain a creative attachment to their work are 
likely to value it higher than would the market); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 675 (2010) (discussing the common view of property, as opposed to the 
“formal legal definition,” that “gives property romance its formidable force”); F. Gregory Lastowka & 
Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36 (2004) (noting “how seriously 
some people take protection of ‘their ideas,’ even in contexts where those ideas cannot be protected 
using the laws of intellectual property”); Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings 
and “Work-Makes-Work,” Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 2091, 2122 (2011) (noting that creators’ description of their work “in material, physical terms 
strengthens their possessive impulse and in some cases manifests as assertions of control that are 
more robust than current intellectual property law provides”); cf., e.g., Fauchart & von Hippel, supra 
note 20, at 199–200 (noting the attribution norm among French chefs who desire reputation-related 
benefits from recipe disclosure). 
23. Cf. CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON, MICROSTYLE: THE ART OF WRITING LITTLE (2011) 
(providing suggestions for effective short communications); Charlene Hagström, Playing with Names: 
Gaming and Naming in World of Warcraft, in DIGITAL CULTURE, PLAY, AND IDENTITY: A WORLD OF 
WARCRAFT READER 265, 276 (Hilde G. Corneliussen & Jill Walker Rettberg eds., 2008) (noting that 
creativity in naming is “highly valued” in World of Warcraft). 
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creating our own personal villages of online identities or leaving a “trail of 
discarded online aliases, each a distillation of how we viewed ourselves and our 
place in the world at the time of sign-on.”24 And we can observe how various 
online communities acknowledge and respond to the interests in uniqueness and 
authorial recognition, either by establishing rules of conduct that control the 
names participants can adopt or by enhancing system architecture to accomplish 
the same goals.25 
To be clear, the fact that naming practices may exhibit some of the same 
interests and incentives as other works of authorship does not mean that the law 
should expand to protect naming choices. And not every naming decision exhibits 
the same degree of creativity in selection or invention. But because we can be 
fairly confident that most personal naming choices are incentivized not by 
economic interests but by personality-based interests in creation, expression, and 
authorial recognition, we might use communities, particularly online ones, as 
laboratories to determine whether and how the law should respond to these 
interests. 
I. NAMING AND CREATIVITY 
Naming is not a rote or thoughtless exercise, even if the result of the naming 
process is not particularly interesting or unusual. The naming of a child, a pet, an 
avatar, a product, or a band is a deliberative, creative act that often has cultural 
significance no matter whether the name is selected or invented, in part due to the 
perceived permanence of the decision.26 Names are pondered over, made the 
subject of both informal and formal focus groups, and often kept secret until their 
official release for fear that someone else (another parent or a competing 
company) will use the name first.27 Pharmaceutical names, which are typically 
 
24. Amanda Hess, The Eternal Shame of Your First Online Handle, GOOD (June 29, 2011), 
http://www.good.is/post/the-eternal-shame-of-your-first-online-handle (featuring contributions from 
various writers about why they chose their first screen names). 
25. For example, when Twitter users developed a norm of crediting the original user when a 
tweet was retransmitted, Twitter eventually built “retweeting” functionality into the software to make 
attribution easier. See Axel Bruns, Ad Hoc Innovation by Users of Social Networks: The Case of 
Twitter (Sept. 19, 2011), http://snurb.info/files/2011/Ad Hoc Innovation by Users of Social 
Networks.pdf. 
26. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 116 (“Names of punk and heavy-metal bands have 
long been a genre of antibranding that embraces everything offensive and unappealing.”); John 
Jugensen, From ABBA to ZZ Top, All the Good Band Names Are Taken, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2010, at 
A1 (describing trend in modern rock of “unwieldy or nonsensical” names); Stephanie Kang, Naming 
the Baby: Parents Brand Their Tot with What’s Hot, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2003, at B1 (describing trend of 
naming babies after brand names); Stephanie Rosenbloom, Mi, a Name I Call Myself. And You Are?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2006, at G1 (describing choices users make in selecting screen names). 
27. See, e.g., Alexandra Alter, The Baby-Name Business, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2007, at W1 
(interviewing parents who hired name consultants when naming their children); Ruth Shalit, The Name 
Game, SALON (Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.salon.com/1999/11/30/naming (describing branding 
companies). In such cases, naming begets naming, as in the case of the creative names often given to 
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invented, are subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Administration to ensure 
that creativity in naming doesn’t frustrate effective provision of prescriptions.28 A 
name may attempt to connote certain things about an individual; work as a 
commentary, criticism, or parody of existing structures, names, or rules; or, in 
some cases, be the subject of a public battle over ownership, as occurred during 
the “Roxanne Wars” of the 1980s, in which rap artists released several rounds of 
“answer records” battling over the rights to the name “Roxanne.”29 
The attention given to choosing or inventing a name results from a name’s 
two primary functions: its denotative function and its connotative function.30 A 
name’s denotative function is what allows a name to refer to or identify 
something. When someone tells us that she is going to have lunch with Susan at 
noon or that she is heading to the Apple Store to buy a new iPad, the words 
“Susan,” “Apple,” and “iPad” all, in context, point to a referent identified by a 
shared understanding of that reference among the participants to the 
conversation. A name’s connotative or expressive function conveys or suggests 
certain qualities, characteristics, or attributes about the individual or entity named 
or about the person or entity conferring the name.31 A child’s distinctly religious, 
cultural, or ancestral name typically identifies his or her parents as members of a 
particular community. For example, starting in the 1960s, African American 
parents were considerably more likely to give their children invented names, a 
trend that, Stanley Lieberson concludes, “suggests an influence stemming from 
the broad and intense social and political changes beginning in the 1960s, a period 
marked by intensified African-American social protest, the development of the 
Black Power movement, a renewed emphasis on a distinctive and valued African-
American culture, and black separatism.”32 A chosen name may, similarly, facilitate 
engagement with a particular culture or group, such as when Chinese citizens 
 
software or other products in development. See, e.g., Sagan v. Apple Computer, 874 F. Supp. 1072, 
1074 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (dismissing libel claim by astronomer Carl Sagan alleging that after he objected 
to Apple’s use of “Carl Sagan” as an internal code name for a new personal computer, Apple changed 
the code name to “Butt-Head Astronomer”); Steve Lohr, Can These Guys Make You “Bing”?, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2011, at B1 (reporting that planned upgrades of Microsoft’s search engine had been 
code-named for West Coast rock bands, including Metallica, Nirvana, and Soundgarden). 
28. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., How FDA Reviews Proposed Drug Names, http://www.fda.gov/ 
downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/MedicationErrors/ucm080867.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); James 
Gleick, Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (noting that 
pharmaceutical companies “spend millions on market research to make sure their names are both 
serious and sexy”). 
29. See, e.g., THE ANTHOLOGY OF RAP 11–12 (Adam Bradley & Andrew DuBois eds., 2010). 
30. See Laura A. Heymann, Naming, Identity, and Trademark Law, 86 IND. L.J. 381, 394 (2011). 
31. For an extreme example, see Chaya Babu, Name Changers: 285 Indian Girls No Longer 
“Unwanted,” MSNBC.COM (Oct. 22, 2011, 11:54 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44998378/ 
ns/world_news-wonderful_world (describing how the names “Nakusa” and “Nakushi,” which mean 
“unwanted,” are “widely given to girls across India”). 
32. STANLEY LIEBERSON, A MATTER OF TASTE: HOW NAMES, FASHIONS, AND CULTURE 
CHANGE 76 (2000). 
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adopt English-sounding professional names for business, educational, or other 
purposes.33 A name that connotes a well-known real or fictional individual or 
entity may communicate something about one’s cultural preferences. One of the 
more infamous examples in recent memory is the New Jersey couple whose 
children were named after Adolf Hitler, Heinrich Himmler, and the Aryan 
Nation.34 More benignly, a Missouri man officially changed his name to Led 
Zeppelin II to honor the rock band that, he said, “changed [his] life, forever.”35 A 
wholly invented name may mark an individual as supremely creative or wildly 
unconventional. None of this presumably escapes parents, who support an ever-
growing cottage industry in baby-name advice.36 Companies, likewise, spend large 
sums of money on consultants to aid them in finding brand names for their 
products with appealing linguistic and emotional connotations37 and in avoiding 
missteps based on cultural or other meanings.38 
The denotative and connotative functions of naming, in turn, invoke two 
kinds of interests or motivations. The denotative function requires clarity in 
reference and hence is akin to a trademark interest. George Foreman aside,39 one 
 
33. See Tania Branigan, Facebook’s “Real Name” Policy Attacked by Chinese Blogger, GUARDIAN 
(U.K.), Mar. 9, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/09/chinese-blogger-mark- 
zuckerberg-dog (quoting Chinese commentator Michael Anti (born Zhao Jing) as noting that such 
English names are not fake names but “professional name[s] in the English-speaking world”). 
34. See Lisa W. Foderaro, Naming Children for Nazis Puts Spotlight on the Father, N.Y. TIMES,  
Jan. 20, 2009, at A28. 
35. Valerie Schremp Hahn, New Names Can Bring Joy and Easier Lives, STLTODAY, Sept. 15, 
2011, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/article_aa855f01-4dfe-5b6e-865e-fd38a0288d98.html. 
36. Alter, supra note 27 (reporting that about 80 baby name books were published between 
2004 and 2007, and that more than 100 websites exist on how to choose a baby name). 
37. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 220 (contrasting Latin-sounding technology names from the 
1990s (such as “Lucent”), which connote authority and trust, with later, more whimsical names (such 
as “Twitter”), which “initiate[] an informal and fun interaction”). One study has concluded that 
companies with names that are easier to pronounce are likely to outperform companies with difficult-
to-pronounce names in the initial days of trading. Adam L. Alter & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Predicting 
Short-Term Stock Fluctuations by Using Processing Fluency, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9369, 9371 (2006). 
More functionally, companies may seek particularly inventive names to increase the likelihood that 
their sites will lead the top of the list in a search engine query. See Seth Godin, The New Rules of 
Naming, SETH GODIN’S BLOG (Oct. 16, 2005), http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2005/10/ 
the_new_rules_o.html (describing the author’s choice of “Squidoo” as the name of his online 
company because many users use search engines to find company websites: “This means that having 
the perfect domain name is nice, but it’s WAY more important to have a name that works in 
technorati and yahoo and google when someone is seeking you out.”). 
38. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 55 (discussing Reebok’s decision to call one of its women’s 
athletic shoes “Incubus,” which is “a demon from medieval folklore that rapes women in their 
sleep”). Occasionally, personal naming and product branding become one, as with the couple who 
offered to sell naming rights to their then unborn child. See Matthew Purdy, A Boy Named Soup?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2001, at B1; Joseph P. Fried, Following Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at A39 
(reporting that the couple, receiving no offers, named their son Zane). 
39. The professional boxer George Foreman famously named each of his five sons “George 
Foreman.” Bill Dwyre, By George, He’ll Carry On His Dad’s Legacy in the Ring, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2009, 
at C1. 
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would assume that naming each of one’s children with the same given name 
would tend to cause confusion as to which child was being referred to at a given 
time. Of course, context typically helps in this regard. We can expect that when we 
use the word “apple” in a conversation that our conversational partners will know 
whether we are referring to produce or electronic gadgetry; likewise, we can 
reasonably conclude that the “Madonna” mentioned on the cover of Rolling Stone 
magazine does not denote the same individual as the “Madonna” mentioned 
during Sunday services.40 The challenge arises when context is insufficient to 
resolve a lack of clarity, such as when two individuals with the same name operate 
(or could plausibly operate) in the same space. When a parodist adopted the 
Twitter name “ShaquilleONeal” to offer comic tweets in the voice of the 
professional basketball player, the joke was apparently clear to all of the account’s 
followers (leading O’Neal to use the name “The_Real_Shaq” for his own 
account), but other parodies may not be as clear.41 Thus, part of the concern that 
arises from the naming process is a trademark-like concern: whether the chosen 
reference cleanly points to only one referent or instead creates a likelihood of 
confusion. 
The connotative or expressive function of names, by contrast, gives rise to a 
more copyright-like interest. The selection or creation of a name with an eye and 
ear toward the effect it will have on those who hear it is an act that derives from 
the namer’s creative impulses. To be sure, this may not be creativity on the scale 
of an opera or a novel, but even acts of microcreativity are committed with 
concerns for audience and authorial identity. This is particularly true in 
communities in which naming practices are embedded in cultural values and 
history, in which the conferring of a name situates the named individual in a social 
network,42 but it is true even of more individualistic acts of christening. It should 
therefore be uncontroversial to note that naming is an expressive activity, even if 
the constitutional dimensions of that activity are uncertain.43 
 
40. See Heymann, supra note 30, at 398. 
41. Howard Beck, Off the Dribble: The Real O’Neal Puts His Cyber Foot Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
20, 2008, at B16. O’Neal now uses the name “Shaq” on Twitter. See Shaquille O’Neal, TWITTER, 
http://twitter.com/shaq (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); see also, e.g., Mike Musgrove, When Famed Twitter 
Friend Proves Faux: Behind Some Celeb Feeds Lie Only Tweet Nothings, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2009, at C1 
(reporting that the number of followers of a fake account attributed to Tina Fey more than 
quadrupled after the account was revealed as fake); Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: 
Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851 (2010). 
42. See, e.g., PETER M. WHITELEY, RETHINKING HOPI ETHNOGRAPHY 123 (1998) 
(describing Hopi names as “‘tiny imagist poems’ or narrative mental-pictures through which the 
subject as author delightfully and instructively marks the individual identity of another subject”); Betsy 
Rymes, Naming as Social Practice: The Case of Little Creeper from Diamond Street, 25 LANGUAGE SOC’Y 237, 
246 (1996) (“[J]ust as Hopi names seem simple to outsiders, but reference a world of cultural 
associations for Hopi who understand them, gang names also have stories (and implicit predicates) 
behind them.”). 
43. Henne v. Wright, 904 F.2d 1209, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990) (Arnold, J., dissenting) (discussing 
the naming of a child as an exercise of freedom of speech); Carlton F.W. Larson, Naming Baby: The 
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The creative impulse is particularly salient when the individual is conferring 
the name on himself or herself as an identifier for his or her expressive activities. 
Graffiti writers (those who tag walls or trains) use their names both as a functional 
way of marking their presence and as a medium of creative expression, such that 
writing over another’s tag is often considered akin to an assassination.44 Hip-hop 
performers rarely perform under their given names; indeed, “inventing a name is 
an important part of hip-hop’s performativity.”45 Drag queen names are a critical 
part of developing one’s identity in the community; many such names are 
humorous, parodic, or otherwise entertaining in themselves.46 Roller derby names 
are likewise playful, and particularly creative names, such as “Kristi Imahootchie” 
and “Anne R. Kissed,” give rise to “name envy” among derby participants.47 CB 
radio users typically choose handles that, by communicating something about the 
user, attempt to create the conditions for a fruitful interaction with others48—the 
handle “Loving Mom of 3,” for example, is likely to result in a different initial 
interaction from the one involving the username “Vindictive Misanthrope.”49 
And, more recently, SSIDs (the names that individuals choose for their wireless 
networks) have become a way of “‘asserting individual personality within the 
 
Constitutional Dimensions of Parental Naming Rights, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159, 181 (2011) (asserting 
that naming a child “is a deeply expressive act”). But see Redmond v. Jockey Club, No. 05-6607, 2007 
WL 2250978 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2007) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint alleging a constitutional 
violation in the denial of a racehorse name by a club). 
44. MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 150 (2010). 
45. Id. 
46. See LEILA J. RUPP & VERTA A. TAYLOR, DRAG QUEENS AT THE 801 CABARET 32 (2003) 
(“Being a drag queen requires having a drag name.”); id. at 32–33 (describing how individual drag 
queens devised their drag names); id. at 33–34 (“To a different extent for the different girls, the use of 
drag names symbolizes the creation of a separate personality.”). For a list of drag names used by 
performers in the past, see Drag Queen Names, QUEER MUSIC HERITAGE, http://www.queermusic 
heritage.us/drag-names.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (listing, as examples, “Clare Boothe Luce 
Change” and “Rhea Listik”). 
47. Fagundes, supra note 21, at 1103 n.45 (describing phenomenon of “name envy” among 
roller derby participants as to particularly creative names); id. at 1105 (“Indeed, derby names are often 
the most identifiable and memorable part of bouts for first-time viewers.”); id. at 1106 (“For [some] 
skaters, derby supplies a space for self-discovery and self-expression as well as a fun extracurricular 
activity. A skate name is often the central vehicle by which this self-expression is effected.”); id. at 
1112 (“[Roller derby names] are typically a product of careful thought and effort, so that they express 
not just the holder’s identity, but also her cleverness.”). 
48. Susan J. Kalčik, Women’s Handles and the Performance of Identity in the CB Community, in 
WOMEN’S FOLKLORE, WOMEN’S CULTURE 99, 101–02 (Rosan A. Jordan & Susan J. Kalčik eds., 
1985). 
49. Id. at 108 (noting how the choice of a CB handle “must be one that is safe and 
comfortable for both speaker and listener, if the interaction is to continue. Thus a handle that evokes 
a neutral, joking, or familiar image is often chosen by CBers.”); id. (noting that the use by women 
CBers of handles that “evoke stereotyped images of women help ease entry into the CB community 
and social interaction within it”); cf. How to Choose a Good Twitter Username, DUMMIES.COM, http:// 
www.dummies.com/how-to/content/how-to-choose-a-good-twitter-username.html (last visited Mar. 
29, 2012) (“On Twitter, you want people to respond to you, not be put off by a risqué or otherwise 
questionable username.”). 
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dimensions of metropolitan life’” by broadcasting short messages to a dynamic, 
local community.50 Thus, when writers discuss the process of adopting another 
identity for one’s creative or other endeavors, the choice of a name for that 
identity is often highlighted as an inherent part of that process, an act that is 
creative in its own right51 and that represents “a means to announce one’s 
willingness to play.”52 And just as the wholesale adoption of another’s copyrighted 
work can be seen as transformative or creative,53 the act of naming can be seen as 
creative, even if the particular name chosen is not. This can be seen most starkly 
in the case of artist Kristin Sue Lucas, who in 2007 persuaded a California court to 
allow her to change her name to Kristin Sue Lucas, an action that she 
characterized as a “reboot.”54 
As with other creative acts, however, our assessment of naming choices is 
both contextual and community-based. Some communities value a high degree of 
creativity, while others permit creativity only within explicit or implicit constraints. 
A modestly creative personal name may be admired and eventually adopted by 
others, but a too creative name may be seen as aberrant.55 Parents, conscious of 
 
50. See Lauren Collins, The Tao of WiFi, NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 2011, at 29, 29 (quoting Elihu 
Rubin, professor at the Yale School of Architecture). Collins’s article profiles Alexandra Janelli, who 
maintains a website collecting wireless names, such as “Dumpling Manor,” “More Cowbell,” and 
“Stop Cooking Indian!!!” Id. “Like other forms of self-expression,” Collins notes, “wireless names are 
subject to trends.” Id. 
51. See, e.g., Paul Hemp, Avatar-Based Marketing, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2006, at 1, 2 (“People 
have long taken on alternative identities, from authors’ sly noms de plume to CB radio operators’ 
evocative handles to chatroom visitors’ sexually suggestive user names.”). This is also true for more 
formal name adoptions. For example, a North Dakota high school teacher named Michael Herbert 
Dengler petitioned the North Dakota courts, and later the Minnesota courts, for approval of his 
request to change his name to the number “1069,” which, he believed, “expressed his individuality 
and personal philosophy . . . , each of its four digits, respectively, standing for his relationship with 
nature, time and movement, the universe and ‘essence.’” JUSTIN KAPLAN & ANNE BERNAYS, THE 
LANGUAGE OF NAMES 191 (1997); see also In re Dengler, 246 N.W.2d 758, 764 (N.D. 1976); In re 
Dengler, 287 N.W.2d 637 (Minn. 1979); Thomas M. Lockney & Karl Ames, Is 1069 A Name?, 19 
NAMES 1 (1981). 
52. Haya Bechar-Israeli, From <Bonehead> to <cLoNehEAd>: Nicknames, Play, and Identity on 
Internet Relay Chat, 1 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. (1995), available at http://jcmc.indiana.edu/ 
vol1/issue2/bechar.html. 
53. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 457–59 (2008); Tushnet, supra note 12. 
54. Transcript of Change of Name Hearing at 1, In re Kristin Sue Lucas, No. RG07336497 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 2007); see also Transcript of Change of Name Hearing at 1, In re Kristin Sue 
Lucas, No. RG07336497 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2007) (granting petition). In granting the order, the 
judge adopted Lucas’s metaphor. Id. (“So you have changed your name to exactly what it was before 
in the spirit of refreshing yourself as though you were a web page.”). 
55. LIEBERSON, supra note 32, at 123 (suggesting that an invented name may be more 
appealing to other parents “when it is compatible with general naming trends among the existing 
inventory of names, or the pressure to name a baby after a relative or friend may weaken, or there is a 
decline in the resistance to naming innovations”); cf. Fromer, supra note 10, at 1441 (“In the arts, while 
the newness component of creativity is valued in our individualistic culture, for typical audience 
members and in most artistic contexts . . . it is important that artists not stray too far from accepted 
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the connotative function of names, generally tend to stick to certain linguistic 
conventions; for example, as Stanley Lieberson has documented, “[b]ecause in the 
United States (and most other societies) names mark the infant’s gender, parents 
who invent names still follow the linguistic connections between gender and 
naming that exist among the very same set of major names that they are passing 
over,” such as ending girls’ names, but not boys’ names, with an “a” sound.56 As 
with other aspects of naming, there are race, ethnicity, and class aspects to a 
community’s view of creativity, confirmed (albeit anecdotally) by various first-
person accounts detailing others’ reactions to perceived boundary crossing.57 
Given this connection between naming and creativity, it should not be 
surprising that, for some, names are imbued with a property-like characteristic 
akin to the way some creators view other types of creative expression. This may be 
influenced by Lockean principles; by the same intuition that has led courts to 
recognize that selection and arrangement of existing material, and not simply 
invention, can represent authorship;58 or by cultural norms that dictate what is an 
 
conventions . . . .”). For a description of recent psychological research suggesting that humans are 
“secretly—unconsciously—biased against creative ideas,” see Wray Herbert, A Bias Against Creativity?, 
ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI. (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/news/ 
full-frontal-psychology/a-bias-against-creativity.html. 
56. LIEBERSON, supra note 32, at 206. Lieberson notes that “Joshua” is an exception to this 
general observation. Id. 
57. For one such example, see DaisyDeadhead, On Having a Black Name, DAISY’S DEAD AIR 
(Apr. 22, 2008), http://daisysdeadair.blogspot.com/2008/04/on-having-black-name.html (describing, 
as a “blond, blue-eyed white woman,” others’ reactions to her first name, which went unstated in the 
post but which the writer claimed is “strongly associated with black women”); see also Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title 
VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1325–27 (arguing that 
Title VII should be interpreted to allow claims where names, among other characteristics, are used as 
proxies for race). 
58. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59–60 (1884); cf. Domsalla 
v. Stephens, No. 3:00-CV-2763, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5845, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2001) (“The 
phrase ‘Texas Thunder’ lacks the originality required of copyrighted material. This is evidenced by the 
fact that a simple search on the Internet returns over twenty examples of the use of the phrase by 
people other than Domsalla, including a motor speedway, at least three bands, and a girls’ fastpitch 
softball team. Further, the Defendants have presented examples of forty-six organizations that use the 
phrase ‘Texas Thunder’ in their name. As such, the phrase ‘Texas Thunder’ is not sufficiently original 
to be the subject of a copyright.”); John Barth, Do I Repeat Myself?, ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlantic 
.com/magazine/archive/2011/08/do-i-repeat-myself/8572 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (“Originality, 
after all, includes not only saying something for the first time, but re-saying (in a worthy new way) the 
already said: rearranging an old tune in a different key, to a different rhythm, perhaps on a different 
instrument.”). Some scholars have proposed revising copyright law to reflect originality concerns; my 
observation here is descriptive, not normative. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 486 (2009) (proposing “a more demanding statutory originality requirement 
for copyright,” based on patent law’s obviousness requirement, in which “copyright protects a work 
insofar as the author can show that the work departed from a routine, typical, or conventional 
expression in the pertinent genre at the time he or she authored the work”); Gideon Parchomovsky & 
Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1507 (2009) (proposing a copyright system “that calibrates 
authors’ protection and liability to the originality level of their work”). 
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open resource and what requires authorization to use.59 But, for the most part, the 
law is not a fruitful avenue for vindicating this interest. Hence, as I will discuss 
subsequently, such interests are recognized, if at all, by extralegal community 
regulations and norms. 
II. NAMING, CREATIVITY, AND THE LAW 
Although First Amendment jurisprudence has recognized the value of 
pseudonymity in allowing speakers to communicate in ways that they would not if 
they had to reveal their given names, the law does not pay much attention to the 
creative process involved in choosing pseudonyms, except when such choice 
appears to be motivated by an intention to defraud.60 Cases such as McIntyre and 
the developing case law on whether Internet service providers can be required to 
disclose a subscriber’s identity information are concerned largely with whether the 
government can force an individual or intermediary to reveal the connection 
between a pseudonym and a given name or, relatedly, whether the government 
can criminalize the act of communicating under a pseudonym.61 To the extent that 
these courts have ruled in favor of pseudonymity, they have done so based on a 
belief that allowing pseudonymous communication encourages more (and more 
 
59. As but one example, in a discussion between two First Nation members, hosted by the 
Simon Fraser University Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology in British Columbia, one participant 
stated: 
Then when we have our ceremonies, like the Indian names that we carry, Siaya:mchess. You 
know, no other person, outside my family line, can carry that name. . . . If we were in a 
home where there’s 700 or 800 people and they call me “Siaya:mchess!,” you know, I have to 
stand up, and among 800 people, I’m the only one that stands up. . . . 
A Journey into Time Immemorial: Importance of the Name, SFU MUSEUM, http://www.sfu.museum/time/ 
en/videos/18 (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
 The other participant responded: 
I am very lucky to carry Ai:yametkwa. You know, that’s my name. I can share it if I like, but 
I own that name. So I think that really tells you about the values of what we think is 
important, you know, that you share food, you share your home, or, you know, whatever 
resources there are, but you own something very intrinsic and powerful within you, it’s 
your name, and your song. 
Id. 
60. To the extent that the law does engage with naming and creativity, it is to restrict the 
choices that those seeking official recognition of their names can make. See Heymann, supra note 30, 
at 409–18 (discussing rejection of name-change petitions by courts that conclude that the desired 
names are inappropriate). 
61. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s 
decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content 
of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”); 
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (setting forth 
standards for disclosure); ACLU v. Miller, 997 F. Supp. 1228, 1230–32 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (preliminarily 
enjoining enforcement of a statute criminalizing the knowing transmission of data through a 
computer network “if such data uses any individual name . . . to falsely identify the person”). In his 
concurrence in McIntyre, Justice Thomas noted that creative pseudonyms were used by the Framers 
and others during the constitutional debates. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 367–68 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Often writers would choose names to signal their point of view or to invoke specific classical and 
modern crusaders in an age-long struggle against tyranny.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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diverse) speech, at least some of which is valuable.62 These cases have not, 
however, given rise to a need to focus on the value of pseudonymous choices 
apart from the content to which such pseudonyms are attached. As I will now 
discuss, intellectual property law, while it recognizes naming as a creative act from 
time to time, also largely treats names as property in light of their denotative 
function. 
A. Trademark Law 
Although the development of brands today often involves a creative process, 
trademark law’s primary concern is with disruption of the denotative function of 
names—in other words, whether a trademark can permissibly refer to more than 
one entity. For example, if a producer of soft drinks were to market a cola called 
PEPSI, the PepsiCo corporation, which owns the mark, would object on the 
grounds that consumers would be deceived into believing that this soft drink was 
the same product as the one that PepsiCo produces. If a producer of hammers 
were to market a hammer under the trademark PEPSI, by contrast, the PepsiCo 
corporation might object on the ground that the uniqueness of the famous and 
distinctive trademark PEPSI was likely to be diluted through its use on an 
unauthorized product, even if consumers were clear that the producers of the two 
products were not related. In both cases, the trademark holder’s claims would 
inhere in the assertion that the trademark PEPSI should refer to only one product: 
the cola produced by the PepsiCo corporation (or any additional products the 
company authorized).63 
Trademark jurisprudence has long drawn distinctions between the rights 
conferred by copyright law, which relate to originality and creativity, and the rights 
recognized by trademark law, which relate to denotative commercial use. The U.S. 
Supreme Court made this point most famously in The Trade-Mark Cases, which 
considered whether federal trademark law could be validly enacted pursuant to 
Congress’s power under the Patent and Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: 
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or 
discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the common law is generally the 
growth of a considerable period of use, rather than a sudden invention. It 
 
62. Many scholars have considered whether this is the right balance. See, e.g., Eric J. Friedman 
& Paul Resnick, The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 173, 187–91 
(2001) (proposing a method of encouraging commitment to consistent pseudonyms); Rebecca 
Tushnet, Naming Rights, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 789, 811–16 (noting that pseudonyms can seem 
fraudulent to some readers but are beneficial to others); see generally THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: 
SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010) (presenting 
various views). 
63. In this regard, trademark holders have little cause to complain about unauthorized but 
nondeceptive uses, as many of them dilute the value of their own marks by authorizing them for a 
wide range of disparate products. Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 731, 779 (2003). 
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is often the result of accident rather than design, and when under the act 
of Congress it is sought to establish it by registration, neither originality, 
invention, discovery, science, nor art is in any way essential to the right 
conferred by that act. If we should endeavor to classify it under the head 
of writings of authors, the objections are equally strong. In this, as in 
regard to inventions, originality is required. And while the word writings 
may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include original designs for 
engravings, prints, &c., it is only such as are original, and are founded in 
the creative powers of the mind. The writings which are to be protected 
are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, 
engravings and the like. The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the 
adoption of something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of 
the party using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows out of 
its use, and not its mere adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive 
right attaches upon registration. But in neither case does it depend upon 
novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no 
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought. It is simply 
founded on priority of appropriation.64 
Modern branding practices have rendered some of the Court’s assertions 
outdated. It is true that trademark rights still depend on a “period of use, rather 
than a sudden invention.” But given that many brands are the result of the work 
of advertising agencies and other specialists, we can no longer say that the 
development of the trademark itself is “often the result of accident rather than 
design” or is generally the “adoption of something already in existence,” to the 
extent that those words suggest that trademarks are the result of happenstance 
rather than the result of a creative process. The Court has been clear, however, 
that notions of authors and audiences are not trademark law’s domain. In 2003, in 
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,65 the Court rejected an attempt to 
use the Lanham Act to vindicate attributional interests in a work not protected by 
copyright.66 Copyright law and trademark law, the Court suggested, are different 
animals, and allowing the plaintiff to use the Lanham Act in such circumstances 
would upset a “carefully crafted bargain,” pursuant to which “once the patent or 
copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or work at will 
 
64. The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); see also McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 
254 (1878): 
Words or devices, or even a name in certain cases, may be adopted as trade-marks which 
are not the original invention of the party who appropriates the same to that use; and 
courts of equity will protect the proprietor against any fraudulent use or imitation of the 
device by other dealers or manufacturers. Property in the use of a trade-mark, however, 
bears very little analogy to that which exists in copyrights or in patents for new inventions 
or discoveries, as they are not required to be new, and may not involve the least invention 
or skill in their discovery or application. Phrases, or even words in common use, may be 
adopted for the purpose, if, at the time of their adoption, they were not employed by 
another to designate the same or similar articles of production or sale. 
65. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
66. Id. at 33–34. 
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and without attribution.”67 Lower courts, for their part, have overwhelmingly 
taken Dastar at face value, denying plaintiffs the ability to assert trademark-related 
claims for communicative material for which no copyright claim is available, 
although a few pockets of uncertainty still remain.68 
This seemingly bright-line rule does not mean, however, that courts ignore 
the creative process in branding altogether. For example, it has now become de 
rigueur to assess the inherent strength of a trademark by locating it along what is 
now known as the Abercrombie spectrum, which assesses a word’s inherent strength 
linguistically: an invented (or “fanciful” term) is deserving of the most protection, 
while a generic term deserves no protection whatsoever.69 Between these two 
extremes, the inherent strength of a mark (and therefore whether it gets protection 
ab initio or requires additional evidence) depends on how creative the mark is. 
The mark might be a commonplace and dull description of the good’s qualities or 
characteristics (and therefore might need to be used by others), or use metaphor 
to suggest the good’s characteristics, or create a new meaning for an existing word. 
In short, the Abercrombie spectrum rewards creativity in naming, a fact that has not 
gone unnoticed by some courts.70 This is a copyright-type interest, in that it 
 
67. Id. (quoting Bonita Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989)). 
68. See, e.g., Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 252 (1st Cir. 2004); Agence Fr. Presse v. Morel, 
769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). But see Fleischer Studios, Inc., v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 
958 (9th Cir. 2011) (without citing Dastar, reversing dismissal of plaintiff’s trademark claims relating to 
cartoon character despite affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s copyright claims), superseding 636 F.3d 1115 
(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Dastar). 
69. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see also 
Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1332–33 (2010). 
70. See, e.g., Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The 
more unique the mark, the greater the degree of protection.”); Sinhdarella, Inc. v. Vu, No. C 07-04353 
WHA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14742, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2008) (finding “The Boiling Crab” to 
be suggestive for a seafood restaurant given that “naming a seafood restaurant ‘The Boiling Crab’ 
required some creativity and imagination, meaning significant steps were taken in order to go from 
the name of a seafood restaurant to the name in question”); Synergistic Int’l, Inc. v. Windshield 
Doctor, Inc., No. CV 03-579 FMC (CWx), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12660, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 
2003) (finding “Glass Doctor” for glass installation and repair service to be suggestive given an 
incontestable federal registration and the mark’s “creative metaphorical combination of the terms 
‘Doctor’ and ‘Glass’”); Credit Counseling Ctrs. of Am. v. Budget & Credit Counseling Servs., No. 97 
Civ. 1368 (LAP), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2828, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 1997) (“In the present case, 
the name ‘Credit Counseling Centers of America, Inc.’ seems to lack the creativity or uniqueness to 
qualify as arbitrary or fanciful.”); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Suncrest Mills, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[T]he legend [‘Ritz a Dish’] uses the company name, Ritz, in a creative way to 
suggest the use of the product and its source. That is the very essence of a suggestive mark.”). Once a 
trademark has been adopted, however, trademark law provides an incentive to constrain creativity by 
holding that trademarks that do not maintain a continuing commercial impression among consumers 
may be deemed abandoned. See, e.g., One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., 578 F.3d 1154, 1160–62 
(9th Cir. 2009) (discussing doctrine and citing cases). As Jeanne Fromer has noted, it is not the 
“author” of the trademark—such as an advertising or branding agency—that is awarded legal rights; 
rather, it is the entity that has made commercial use of the author’s creativity that is deemed to be the 
trademark owner. Jeanne Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1885, 1899 (2011). This arrangement, however, is not that different from the work-for-hire 
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distinguishes between less creative marks, which should be available to others 
except in limited circumstances, and more creative or authored marks, which 
should be protected against copying by others, similar to copyright doctrine’s 
idea/expression distinction. 
Indeed, some courts have described the belief that creativity is related to the 
scope of trademark protection in language that sounds in copyright-like principles. 
In Security Center, Ltd. v. First National Security Centers,71 for example, the Fifth 
Circuit characterized the scope of suggestive marks as asking “whether the first 
user has devised a term of some creativity or cleverness, as opposed to merely 
selecting a term that anyone might readily have chosen,” noting that “[a]ny dunce 
could come up with a generic term.”72 The court then concluded that “only a 
modicum of creativity” was required to come up with the mark “Security Center” 
as the name for a business providing private storage facilities; in language 
reminiscent of Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,73 it noted that the 
mark was “merely a coupling of two quite common English words, and the 
coupling itself exhibits little originality.”74 And in Dreamwerks Production Group, Inc. 
v. SKG Studio,75 Judge Kozinski, in writing for the majority, cast doubt on the 
defendant’s contention that “almost every combination of words has been taken 
by someone doing business somewhere in what may be a loosely related field”76 
by suggesting that the defendant could easily have authored a new mark. “A clever 
 
relationships that govern many copyrightable works. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a 
work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the 
author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written 
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.”). 
71. Sec. Ctr., Ltd. v. First Nat’l Sec. Ctrs., 750 F.2d 1295 (5th Cir. 1985). 
72. Id. at 1299. Although one might deem a mark suggestive because of the creative work 
done by the consumer to understand the metaphorical connection between mark and product, this 
kind of work on the consumer’s part is, presumably, what was intended by the producer in naming its 
product and is therefore not dramatically different from other interpretive work done by readers and 
audiences with respect to works of authorship. See id. (“Creativity on the part of the mark’s inventor is 
a correlative of imagination on the part of the consumer.”). 
73. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (noting that 
copyrightability requires “independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”); id. at 362 (noting that 
the plaintiff’s telephone directory was a “garden-variety white pages directory”). 
74. The mark was therefore found to be descriptive. Sec. Ctr., Ltd., 750 F.2d at 1299. The 
parallel is not precise because under Feist, a “modicum of creativity” is all that is required for 
copyrightability, whereas the Fifth Circuit used the phrase in a more denigrating fashion. See also 
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 652 n.16 (8th Cir. 1984) (Bright, J., 
dissenting) (contending that plaintiff’s choice of “LA” as a brand for low-alcohol beer, given its 
knowledge that “LA” was used generically for low-alcohol beer in other countries, “undermine[s] its 
claim that, in choosing the name ‘LA,’ it exercised any creativity entitling it to protection under our 
trademark laws”); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., 
concurring) (noting that because plaintiff “did not originate” its mark (in that it “had previously been 
utilized by others in selling automobile-engines, a shaving-cream and an after-shave lotion”), “the 
scope of its monopoly should be peculiarly restricted”). 
75. Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998). 
76. Id. at 1132. 
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new trademark,” Kozinski wrote, “diversifies both the marketplace and the 
marketplace of ideas; a takeoff or copy of a mark, even if accidental, adds nothing 
but confusion. This dispute could have been avoided had DreamWorks been 
more careful, or a tad more creative, in choosing its name.”77 
Trade dress cases also show a concern with creativity when they focus on 
whether the plaintiff’s packaging is “unique or unusual in a particular field” and 
thus potentially inherently distinctive, or, by contrast, constitutes a common 
design or a “mere refinement of a commonly-adopted and well-known form of 
ornamentation.”78 As one court has described it, 
the determination of whether a distinctive trade dress is entitled to 
Lanham Act protection is in essence a resolution of the tension that 
necessarily arises between the need to encourage and protect creativity in 
the market place while at the same time insuring [sic] that no competitor 
in the market is able to insulate itself from effective competition.79 
Thus, in a case involving a red dripping wax seal on Maker’s Mark whiskey, the 
court concluded that the seal was “an extremely strong mark due to its unique 
design and the company’s singular marketing efforts.”80 The court further 
concluded that the strength of the mark was particularly important to the analysis 
in the case because “trademark laws are designed, in part, to protect creativity, 
brand identification and brand design loyalty.”81 
Trademark infringement cases are not the only types of trademark cases that 
are concerned (if obliquely) with authorship. Trademark antidilution law, which 
prohibits the copying of a famous and distinctive trademark even in circumstances 
where there is no evidence of consumer confusion,82 also involves authorship 
interests despite its denotative focus. As with a copyright holder’s claim that 
unauthorized copies of its work diminish the copyright holder’s economic or 
reputational interests, a trademark holder’s dilution claim alleges that unauthorized 
copies of its mark dilute the economic or reputational value of the mark, making it 
more common or unsavory. It is true that, contrary to Frank Schechter’s original 
proposal,83 dilution law now extends to any famous and distinctive mark, and not 
merely to fanciful or arbitrary marks. In this regard, Schechter’s original 
framework reflected creativity concerns to an even greater extent; like the 
 
77. Id.; cf. Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 673 
(2004) (“One reason why trademark law has traditionally granted broader protection to inherently 
distinctive marks is to provide an incentive to trademark producers to generate new words rather than 
appropriate from the language preexisting words for commercial purposes.”). 
78. Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
79. Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 940 F. Supp. 663, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
80. Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 691 (W.D. Ky. 
2010), aff’d, Nos. 10-5508, 10-5586, 10-5819, 2012 WL 1605755 (6th Cir. May 9, 2012). 
81. Id. 
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
83. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 
828–31 (1926). 
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Abercrombie spectrum, it would have rewarded the effort expended in authoring a 
new word or metaphor. But even courts assessing dilution of nonfanciful marks 
have come to see the harm to be prevented as the copying of the mark per se, and 
not copying that has led to some demonstrable reputational harm.84 Even the 
traditional definition of dilution—activity that causes a “whittling away of the 
value of a trademark”85—has echoes in the fourth fair-use factor in the Copyright 
Act, which considers “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.”86 As to that factor, the Supreme Court has noted, 
courts should take into account “not only the extent of market harm caused by the 
particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also whether unrestricted and 
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant would result in a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the original,”87 the same 
type of cumulative effect on the value of the plaintiff’s property right that anti-
dilution law targets. 
Despite these discussions, acknowledgment of creativity is undoubtedly a 
secondary matter in trademark law as adjudicated. Consistent with trademark law’s 
focus on consumer protection, the courts’ primary concern is with the denotative 
function of the name—that is, whether the name successfully functions as a 
referent to a good or service. But the courts’ nod to creativity reminds us that 
adjudication takes place largely against an assumption that trademarks are 
intellectual property: that they are the result of a type of creative process, which 
leads to their ability to be owned88 and for calls to limit the scope of that 
ownership when others use existing marks in service of their own creative 
efforts.89 So when corporations assert “my name is my property,” perhaps we 
should not be surprised when individuals do the same. 
 
84. For example, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the federal 
dilution statute to provide for a “rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong inference, that a 
new mark used to sell sex-related products is likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear 
semantic association between the two,” a standard that focuses on linguistics, not on evidence of 
tarnishment. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 385 (6th Cir. 2010). 
85. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 24:94 (4th ed. Supp. 2004) (“Like being stung by a hundred bees, significant 
[dilution] injury is caused by the cumulative effect, not by just one.”). 
86. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
87. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (internal quotation marks and 
ellipsis omitted). 
88. See Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the 
Public Domain, Part II, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 191, 242 (1994) (discussing how an expansive 
view of trademarks as investments, and therefore property, has a “quasi-authorial” feel); Greg 
Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 791–98 (2011) (discussing how some courts 
protect creativity through trademark law). 
89. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 960 (1993). 
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B. Copyright Law 
It is standard copyright doctrine in the United States that names are not 
eligible for copyright protection.90 The reason typically given is that a name, like a 
title or a short phrase, is not an “original work of authorship”91 because it does 
not possess even a modicum of creativity.92 This is, of course, a legal fiction, as 
the overview in Part I attests. Names such as John Smith or Elizabeth Brown, 
while functional, may not seem particularly creative (although they, too, are acts of 
micro-authorship), but names such as Ludacris or Currer Bell or Eminem seem to 
exhibit at least as much creativity as Abraham Zapruder’s copyrightable film of the 
Kennedy assassination.93 Some courts, therefore, interpret the general rule not as 
setting forth an absolute bar to copyrightability but rather as setting up an inverse 
relationship: the shorter the phrase, the more creativity that has to be 
demonstrated before copyright will attach.94 
The fact that names are generally deemed to be uncopyrightable does not 
mean, however, that naming is irrelevant to assessments of creativity in copyright 
law. For example, when courts consider whether a fictional character has crossed 
the line from being merely a stock type that anyone can copy (the dastardly villain, 
the bloodthirsty vampire, the pining young lover) to being a sufficiently delineated 
result of the creative process, one relevant characteristic is whether the character  
 
 
90. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2011) (noting various works not subject to copyright, including 
“[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or designs; mere 
variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or coloring; mere listing of ingredients or 
contents”); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1013 (1990) (“Language is 
sufficiently crucial that we insist on unrestricted access to words, even new words.”). 
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
92. See, e.g., Allen v. Destiny’s Child, No. 06 C 6606, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63001, at *25 
(N.D. Ill. July 21, 2009) (“Short phrases tend to be excluded from copyright protection because they 
do not demonstrate a sufficient amount of creative expression.”). 
93. JOHNSON, supra note 23, at 174 (calling “Jello Biafra,” the stage name of the lead singer of 
the rock band The Dead Kennedys, “a testament to the power that the juxtaposition of two simple 
words can unleash”); see also Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 575, 578 (2005) (noting that “[m]any very small expressions positively leap over the low 
threshold of originality we have established in copyright law” and proposing that copyright law 
abandon the fiction that they do not). Zapruder’s film was held to be copyrightable in Time Inc. v. 
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
94. See, e.g., Allen, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63001, at *28 (declining to find as a matter of law 
that no reasonable jury could conclude that the phrase “cater to you,” as used as the title of a song 
and in lyrics, was copyrightable); J. Racenstein & Co. v. Wallace, No. 96 Civ. 9222 (TPG), 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12675, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1999) (“[T]he relevant question for the court is not 
merely whether a name, title or slogan contains some minimal number of words. Rather it is whether 
the phrase contains some appreciable level of creativity, however few words it may contain.”) (citation 
omitted); see also 1–2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 
(2007) (“It appears, then, that there is a reciprocal relationship between creativity and independent 
effort. The smaller the effort (e.g., two words) the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to 
claim copyright protection.”). 
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has been named.95 In Gaiman v. McFarlane, involving a dispute between Neil 
Gaiman and Todd McFarlane over the copyrightability of two comic-book 
characters (Count Nicholas Cogliostro and Medieval Spawn), the Seventh Circuit 
held that while a stock character could not be protected by copyright, a character 
that, in that case, was delineated by age, a title, a name, particular facial features, 
and other characteristics had become a “distinctive character” that was 
copyrightable.96 Likewise, the similarity of the defendant’s character’s name to the 
plaintiff’s character’s name does not mandate a finding of infringement, but some 
courts have found such similarity to be a relevant consideration.97 This does not 
 
95. Cf. LIEBERSON, supra note 32, at 224–30 (discussing writers’ choice of character names); 
ROBERT HARBOROUGH SHERARD, EMILE ZOLA: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY 88–89 
(1893) (quoting Zola) (“I always judge a young author by the names he bestows on his characters. If 
the names seem to me to be weak, or to be unsuitable to the people who bear them, I put the author 
down as a man of little talent, and am no longer greatly interested in his book. . . . It is one of the first 
rules of the novelist’s art. Bad authors choose bad names.”). 
96. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004); id. at 661 (“Although Gaiman’s 
verbal description of Cogliostro may well have been of a stock character, once he was drawn and 
named and given speech he became sufficiently distinctive to be copyrightable.”); see also Bach v. 
Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (finding the 
character name “Jonathan Livingston Seagull” a relevant factor in determining copyrightability); 
Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDK (Gx), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11109, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
26, 1989) (finding that the Rocky Balboa character “is such a highly delineated character that his name 
is the title of all four of the Rocky movies”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. 
H-82-2377, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15942, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982) (finding that plaintiff 
movie studio was likely to prevail on its copyright infringement claim targeting the use of “E.T.” on 
merchandise given that the character was “distinctive and well developed”). But see, e.g., Silberstein v. 
Fox Entm’t Grp., 424 F. Supp. 2d 616, 630 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that because “[n]ames of cartoon 
characters, in particular, are not considered protectable,” only the “original physical characteristics” of 
the plaintiff’s character should be analyzed), aff’d sub nom. Silberstein v. John Does 1–10, No. 04-4401-
cv, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 14128 (2d Cir. June 14, 2007). A character’s name need not be unusual to 
serve the purpose of delineation; indeed, one scholar contends that a novelist “typically indicates his 
intention of presenting a character as a particular individual by naming him in exactly the same way as 
particular individuals are named in ordinary life.” IAN WATT, THE RISE OF THE NOVEL 18 (1957); see 
also id. at 20 (suggesting that the novelist Henry Fielding took some of his characters’ names 
“somewhat at random from a printed list of contemporary persons”); ALASTAIR FOWLER, KINDS OF 
LITERATURE 82–87 (1982) (offering qualifications of Watt’s thesis). 
97. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that 
the district court found the similarity of names of defendants’ and plaintiffs’ characters to be a 
relevant consideration in its infringement analysis); Hogan v. DC Comics, 48 F. Supp. 2d 298, 311 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that similarity in character names, “by itself, is insufficient to establish 
substantial similarity between the characters” but “is, however, a significant similarity”); NIMMER, 
supra note 94, § 2.12 (“Although copying of a character’s name is not in itself decisive, it is a factor to 
be considered in determining whether the character as appropriated is sufficiently distinctive to 
constitute an infringement.”); cf. Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1956) (noting that 
although the title of a song, by itself, was not subject to copyright protection, “the title of a 
copyrighted work should be taken into account when the same title is applied to a work copied from 
it”). But see Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 828 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Use of the same 
names does not sufficiently support infringement, especially when attached to such different 
characters . . . .”); Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co., 681 F. Supp. 813, 818 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that 
similarity in character names and other characteristics “[does] not rise to the level of substantial 
similarity necessary for Plaintiff to sustain her case”). 
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seem surprising: If an author were to write a novel involving a child wizard that 
shared at least some characteristics with the Harry Potter character, we might 
expect that the author would be more likely to be found to have infringed J.K. 
Rowling’s copyright if the character were called Sally Cotter than if she were called 
Winifred Anderson. The name Harry Potter signals that the character is a 
particular result of Rowling’s creative efforts, as opposed to a stock figure. 
Because audiences are accustomed to the use of names to evoke, such as when a 
comedic film targets a cultural icon through an obvious play on its name,98 the use 
of a character’s name in particular primes the audience to think in terms of 
similarity, with context indicating whether that similarity constitutes parody or 
infringement. 
The taxonomy cases are another area in which creativity in designation has 
been found relevant to the copyrightability analysis. In American Dental Ass’n v. 
Delta Dental Plans Ass’n (ADA),99 the Seventh Circuit held that a taxonomy that 
assigned numbers and descriptions to various dental procedures (to be used for 
billing and insurance filings, among other purposes) was copyrightable, such that 
the defendant association could encourage dentists to use the codes when 
submitting their bills but it could not distribute copies of the code itself.100 The 
reason, the court concluded, was that the taxonomy was invented out of whole 
cloth by the plaintiff (and various committee members): The descriptions were 
“original to the ADA, not knuckling under to an order imposed on language by 
some ‘fact’ about dental procedures,” and the numbers (which are akin to names 
for our purposes) likewise represented choices “original to the author of a 
taxonomy, [such that] another author could do things differently.”101 Compare 
this result to the Third Circuit’s decision in Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp.,102 in 
which the plaintiff, having developed a system that assigned numbers to parts 
based on each part’s characteristics (such as material or size), claimed copyright in 
the numbers that resulted from the system. The Third Circuit, distinguishing 
ADA, held that these numbers reflected no authorship: Once the plaintiff had 
devised the numbering system, “all of the products in the class could be numbered 
without the slightest element of creativity. Indeed, if any creativity were allowed to 
creep into the numbering process, the system would be defeated.”103 The Southco 
numbers were denotative before they were individually listed—as with the names 
in Feist ’s telephone directory, they served only to implement a naming decision 
 
98. For example, the Mel Brooks film Spaceballs, a parody of the Star Wars films (and other 
science fiction films), featured numerous characters whose names were intended to evoke their 
corresponding characters in Star Wars, including Yogurt (for Yoda), Princess Vespa (for Princess 
Leia), and Dark Helmet (for Darth Vader). SPACEBALLS (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1987). 
99. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997). 
100. Id. at 981. 
101. Id. at 979. 
102. Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004). 
103. Id. at 282. 
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that had already been made. The ADA numbers, by contrast, were denotative 
only after they came into existence—before that assignment by the ADA, they 
pointed to nothing except their own expression, such that any other number 
might have been chosen instead, and thus were copyrightable. 
Given, then, that the process of naming sometimes involves creativity, we 
need an alternative theory as to why names should be excluded from copyright’s 
scope. One such explanation might rely on the incentive theory of copyright. 
Copyright law is ostensibly justified on the grounds that authors are unlikely to 
create certain categories of works without the incentive that copyright law 
provides; without such an incentive, creators would drop out of the market due to 
an inability to compete with copyists, who need recoup only the costs of copying 
and not the costs of production. Because it is likely that we have nonmarket 
incentives to bestow names on our children, pets, products, and creative identities, 
without any added incentives, copyright law arguably need not operate in this 
realm104 or (to borrow from Judge Kozinski’s opinion in Dreamwerks Production 
Group v. SKG Studio105) ought to extend only to particularly creative names in order 
to encourage inventiveness and thereby enrich, if not the language as a whole, at 
least the onomastic catalogue. Other explanations might invoke the bar against 
duplication that is at the heart of copyright’s protection. Justin Hughes has 
suggested, for example, that a name, once adopted, becomes a social fact open to 
use by anyone as the most efficient way of referring to a person, even if a name is 
seen as created rather than discovered.106 In other words, a name is 
uncopyrightable not primarily because of its length but because it represents an 
instance in which fact and expression merge—you cannot refer to how something 
is named without using the name itself. Once we have all agreed to call a man 
“Robert” (in response to his informing us that “Robert” is what he desires to be 
called), that name takes on the status of a fact just as much as does the height of 
Mount Kilimanjaro. We cannot offer the statement “That man is named Robert” 
without using the name Robert, and so copyright would not protect the name 
Robert just as it would not protect the height of Mount Kilimanjaro.107 Similarly, 
 
104. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 
2011 WIS. L. REV. 141 (2011); Hughes, supra note 93, at 610–13; Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: 
Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009). 
105. Dreamwerks Prod. Grp v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1998). 
106. Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 43, 92–93 (2007) (discussing when the incentives of copyright law might be needed for the 
invention of “created facts”). 
107. Id.; see also, e.g., Hayden v. Chalfant Press, 281 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1960) (noting that 
once a mapmaker had “christened a geographic location, and depicted such name on a copyrighted 
map, such name may be used with impunity by later cartographers, and such name is not a part of the 
protected portion of the copyright”); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and 
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 154 n.21 (1992) (“[O]ne’s address does not cease to be a 
fact upon a showing that the name of one’s street originated in the fancy of a housing developer.”); cf. 
Litman, supra note 90, at 996–97 (“Facts, however, do not exist independently of the lenses through 
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as David McGowan has suggested, we might deny copyright protection to names 
because we want to encourage the use of them to refer to the individuals named, 
not encourage unrelated nicknames or other variations.108 As with the nominative 
fair use doctrine in trademark law, copyright law, under this view, should permit 
the use of names for their denotative purpose because it would be hugely 
inefficient to require others to substitute descriptions of the individual named.109 
These theories tell us something about the appropriate spheres in which law 
should operate. Notably, neither theory requires us to deny that the act of naming 
involves considerations of authorship and creativity. Rather, these theories 
indicate that copyright law should deny protection to names because copyright 
law, like trademark law, has an overriding interest in the denotative use of names. 
In other words, names should not be copyrightable because restrictions on their 
use would impede the ability of others to engage in the act of referring. If the 
parents who name their daughter Jennifer Smith can then claim that “Jennifer 
Smith” is protected by copyright law, her future teachers will have to record her 
name in student records as “the little girl with brown hair and red eyeglasses in the 
second row” or risk liability for infringement. Where there is a denotative clash, 
trademark law operates to solve the problem (at least, where commercial use is at 
issue); otherwise, the heavy machinery of the law is likely ill-suited to deal with 
conflicts relating to naming’s expressive functions. 
Thus, while both trademark law and copyright law recognize that creativity is 
relevant to the naming process, both doctrines elevate the denotative function of 
names over the connotative. The underlying principles of these doctrines, 
however, are mirrored in many community and social norms surrounding naming. 
In some instances, communities protect the denotative function of names by 
prohibiting or discouraging name duplication when such duplication is likely to 
deceive or cause confusion. In other instances, communities protect the 
expressive function of names by prohibiting or discouraging name duplication that 
is seen as a violation of another’s property interest in the name. For our 
hypothetical letter writer, her community’s constraints are soft norms only: the 
 
which they are viewed. . . . In this sense, facts are no more ‘out there’ than are plots, words, or 
sculptural forms.”). 
108. David McGowan, Copyright and Convergence: A Pragmatic Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS: COPYRIGHT AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 233, 248–
49 (Robert F. Brauneis ed., 2009). 
109. Cf., e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“[O]ne might refer to ‘the two-time world champions’ or ‘the professional basketball team 
from Chicago,’ but it’s far simpler (and more likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls. In 
such cases, use of the trademark does not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because 
the mark is used only to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.”). Both Hughes and 
McGowan discuss the part-number cases in light of their respective theories. See Hughes, supra note 
106, at 62–67 (analyzing part-number cases as example of social facts); McGowan, supra note 108, at 
250 (“Refusing to extend copyright to either the part numbers or compilations of them (catalogues) 
implements the policy decision that uniformity is better than variation.”). 
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trust among friends or family members that name copying is inappropriate. Online 
communities, by contrast, have developed more formal constraints, and so are 
particularly fertile grounds for observing this phenomenon. 
III. NAMING AND NORMS ONLINE 
As with other facets of our identities, the names we choose to communicate 
with each other electronically involve a degree of “social signaling.”110 Many of us 
have spent considerable time choosing an e-mail address or an alias for 
communicating on blogs, message boards, or virtual worlds,111 and, likewise, many 
of us have no doubt bemoaned the inelegance of the usernames that are imposed 
upon us as part of corporate e-mail accounts and the like. In environments 
ranging from Second Life to chat rooms to blog comments, the choice of a name 
is one of the first instances of creativity that takes place before further 
participation can begin.112 Writers from both within and outside online 
communities have noted the creativity inherent in naming, not only from a 
functional perspective—choosing something that has not already been taken and 
thus enabling the user to participate in the network in the first place—but as a 
representation of personhood.113 Names invoke cultural connotations, engage in 
wordplay, tell jokes, and even work as slogans or other direct communications to 
others.114 
Users, recognizing that identities are rooted in communities, may choose 
different names for different communities. One’s e-mail address for business 
communications, for example, may reflect a different personality from the one 
reflected by one’s personal e-mail account; likewise, one may choose to blog on 
 
110. Victoria McArthur, Professional Second Lives: An Analysis of Virtual World 
Professionals and Avatar Appearance Codes 22 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished thesis, York University) (on 
file with author). 
111. See Rosenbloom, supra note 26. 
112. RICHARD A. BARTLE, DESIGNING VIRTUAL WORLDS 179 (2004) (“Players identify 
more with their characters if they get to choose the names themselves; name selection is the first and 
arguably most important decision concerning their virtual identity that a player can make.”). 
113. EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF 
ONLINE GAMES 32–33 (2005) (discussing a hypothetical example of the process one might go 
through to create one’s online identity); DAVID CRYSTAL, LANGUAGE AND THE INTERNET 160 
(2001) (“As with all self-selected names (such as car licence plates and CB handles), owners get 
attached to [online names]. The nick is their electronic identity; it says something about who they are, 
and acts as an invitation to others to talk to them.”); Bechar-Israeli, supra note 52 (noting that in the 
text-based environment of IRC, nicknames (or “nicks”) are “critical means of presenting ourselves. 
They are the only initial way of saying who we are, in literally one word or expression.”). 
114. One of the hypothetical names that Linden Lab uses to explain how display names work 
in Second Life is an entire phrase (“Torley amplifies YOUR awesome”). Secondlife, Display Names 
Essentials: Second Life Video Tutorial, YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=eGoHjGz2OaQ; CRYSTAL, supra note 113, at 161 (describing the linguistic playfulness of 
names as being of “sometimes virtuoso quality”); David Jacobson, Contexts and Cues in Cyberspace: The 
Pragmatics of Naming in Text-Based Virtual Realities, 52 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 461, 468 (1996) (“A 
perusal of any social MOO reveals that most character names are, in fact, both fictional and playful.”). 
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professional topics under one screen name and on cultural interests under 
another, with no indication that the two names are linked.115 And as in the offline 
world, different kinds of creativity online may be seen in different cultural 
subgroups. Part of this creativity, as with other kinds of creation, involves 
borrowing from other works in order to communicate the author’s own 
characteristics, preferences, and desires. An early study of the hacker community, 
for example, observed that hackers “take pride in their assumed names,” which 
are “borrowed liberally from the anti-heroes of science fiction, adventure fantasy, 
and heavy metal rock lyrics, particularly among younger users, and from word 
plays on technology, nihilism, and violence.”116 Children and adolescents who do 
not use their given names or real-world nicknames online often choose screen 
names that reference favorite characters, celebrities, or other elements of popular 
culture.117 
Through their terms of service and developed norms, online communities 
provide the rules that govern creativity in naming in ways similar to the formal 
constraints of copyright and trademark law. And, like those doctrines, the rules 
sometimes recognize and validate participants’ creative choices and sometimes 
serve to squelch them. Communities that are concerned primarily with the 
denotative function of names will have rules or norms that allow use of others’ 
 
115. See, e.g., Benjamin M. Gross, Names of Our Lives, 4 IEEE INT’L CONF. COMPUTATIONAL 
SCI. ENGINEERING 747, 751 (2009); Benjamin M. Gross & Elizabeth F. Churchill, Addressing 
Constraints: Multiple Usernames, Task Spillage and Notions of Identity, CHI ’07 EXTENDED ABSTRACTS ON 
HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYSTEMS 2393, 2394 (2007) (noting that users often maintain different 
online identities for different purposes); id. at 2397 (noting that lower “status and prestige” of 
previous user names was often given as a reason for creating a new online identity). Some 
commentators, however, have suggested that we should tolerate this kind of pseudonymity less in 
close-knit communities, rather than more, on the theory that the harms that can be exacted within 
such communities represent a greater breach of trust. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Objectification and 
Internet Misogyny, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION, supra note 62, 
at 68, 85 (“Regulation must consider the size of the community, the status of the objectified victim, 
and the likelihood of serious damage, both to individuals and to the community.”). 
116. Gordon Meyer & Jim Thomas, The Baudy World of the Byte Bandit: A Postmodernist 
Interpretation of the Computer Underground 22 (June 10, 1990) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37110947/The-Baudy-World-of-the-Byte-Bandit-A-Postmodernist-Interpret. 
117. See Sandra L. Calvert et al., Gender Differences in Preadolescent Children’s Online Interactions: 
Symbolic Modes of Self-Presentation and Self-Expression, 24 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 627, 635 
(2003) (describing results of a study in which most children using a virtual world chose a real name or 
nickname for their avatars; among children who did not, most girls chose names based on musical 
pop culture, whereas no boys did so); Gill Valentine & Sarah L. Holloway, Cyberkids? Exploring 
Children’s Identities and Social Networks in On-Line and Off-line Worlds, 92 ANNALS ASS’N AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 302, 310 (2002) (describing, based on interviews with British children, how “the 
nicknames [some children] give themselves on-line are a product of their off-line lives”). One study of 
name choices among teenage bloggers concluded that, of the blogs studied, bloggers were about as 
likely to use their real-life names as an invented online name, with no difference relating to gender. 
David Huffaker, Gender Similarities and Differences in Online Identity and Language Use Among 
Teenage Bloggers 53–54 (Apr. 28, 2004) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University) (on file 
with author); see also id. at 72 (“The online presentations of teenagers demonstrate that blogs are an 
extension of the real-world, rather than a place where people like to pretend.”). 
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names so long as that use is not likely to deceive, defraud, or confuse other 
members of the community. Communities that are concerned with the expressive 
function of naming may have rules or norms that prohibit particular kinds of 
names from being used in that community, such as names that are profane or 
obscene, or may prohibit duplication of names regardless of any possible 
deception or confusion, thus giving the first creator a type of ownership right in 
the name. 
In online communities, recognition of the creativity involved in naming 
manifests itself in two primary ways: whether the online community allows 
participants to freely choose their own usernames without restrictions, and 
whether participants are permitted to duplicate an existing username even when 
there is no issue of impersonation or deception. These aspects of naming—the 
valorizing of authorship and the scope of its exclusivity—mirror, although they 
are obviously not governed by, copyright law. Two recent policy changes serve as 
small case studies here: (1) Google’s decision in the early days of its social network 
Google+ (which I will refer to henceforth as “Google Plus,” for ease of reading) 
to require participants to use their real names on the service,118 and (2) Linden 
Lab’s decision, in late 2010, to move from a system of restricted account names in 
Second Life to a system of a stable usernames plus freely chosen display names, 
including display names that duplicate a display name already in use by another 
participant. I don’t claim that these examples lead to any definitive conclusions; 
my discussion of the reactions to these policies by users is decidedly nonscientific 
and nonuniversal. But they do help us to understand the interests that are at stake 
for at least some users when their assumptions surrounding naming are upended. 
A. The Desire for Creativity 
Online participants have often noted that they prefer the ability to express 
themselves creatively when choosing an online name. In the wake of the initial 
Google Plus policy, writers, activists, and others spoke out on the importance of 
being able to choose the names with which one communicates online.119 But in 
any online environment, the system’s corporate owner can control almost every 
aspect of the experience, either through the architecture of the system or by 
policies that exact compliance as a condition of participation, and naming is no 
different in this regard. For some environments, the architecture of the system 
 
118. In January 2012, Google changed its policy to permit nicknames or pseudonyms upon 
proof that the individual is known by that name elsewhere. See Claire Cain Miller, In a Switch, Google 
Plus Now Allows Pseudonyms, NYTIMES.COM (Jan. 23, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/ 
23/in-a-switch-google-plus-now-allows-pseudonyms; see also Google+ Page and Profile Names, 
GOOGLE+, http://support.google.com/plus/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1228271 (last visited 
June 15, 2012) (“If we challenge the name you intend to use, you will be asked to submit proof that 
this is an established identity with a meaningful following.”). 
119. See Martin Kaste, Who Are You, Really? Activists Fight for Pseudonyms, NPR.ORG (Sept. 28, 
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/09/28/140879480/who-are-you-really-activists-fight-for-pseudonyms. 
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may act as a constraint on creativity (or, conversely, inspire users to be more 
creative within those constraints). Some early e-mail accounts, for example, 
allowed usernames of no more than eight characters, which, as one writer has 
noted, made it unlikely that usernames would resemble users’ full given names.120 
Corporate e-mail accounts often render employees’ names in a systematic way, 
with little choice in how employees’ names will be represented (or truncated); the 
systematic way in which each e-mail address is formed can sometimes make 
unknown corporate e-mail accounts easy to guess once one address is known. 
Some virtual worlds impose similar restrictions. For example, the character name 
policy of EVE Online requires all usernames to contain at least four, but no more 
than twenty-four, alphanumeric characters.121 And until late 2010, Second Life did 
not support European, Asian, and other Unicode characters in usernames—which 
limited choices by those who wanted to express themselves in languages that use 
those characters122—and required that the surnames of all usernames be chosen 
from a list provided by Linden Lab.123 
Other naming restrictions are provided by terms of use and similar policies. 
Like section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, many networks prohibit usernames that have 
certain connotations, such as names that are offensive or obscene. The terms of 
use for Blizzard’s World of Warcraft, however, go further, prohibiting not only 
character names that are offensive or racist but also, inter alia, any name that 
belongs or refers to a pop culture or religious figure; any name that consists of a 
partial or complete sentence (“Inyourface”) or gibberish; any name that “utilizes 
‘Leet’ or ‘Dudespeak’” (such as “Roflcopter”); any name that incorporates a title 
(such as “KingMike” or “CorporalTed”); and any name that uses a misspelling or 
alternative spelling to circumvent these restrictions.124 EVE Online prohibits not 
 
120. Matt Haughey, Growing Old Online, WHOLE LOTTA NOTHING (Apr. 17, 2003, 12:00 AM), 
http://a.wholelottanothing.org/2003/04/growing-old-online.html. 
121. EVE Online User and Character Name Policy, EVE ONLINE, http://www.eveonline.com/ 
pnp/namepolicy.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter EVE Online Policy]. 
122. Jack Linden, Display Names: Bringing Greater Self-Expression to Second Life, SECOND LIFE 
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/Features/Display-Names-Bringing-Greater-
Self-Expression-to-Second-Life/ba-p/660251/page/10. 
123. See Avril Korman, The Name Game: Display Names and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 13, 2011), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2101600/The-
Name-Game-Display-Names-and-the-Law-Of-Unintended-Consequences (describing problems with 
the new policy). This control over surnames is similar to what governments, totalitarian and 
otherwise, have done and continue to do worldwide. See, e.g., James C. Scott et al., The Production of 
Legal Identities Proper to States: The Case of the Permanent Family Surname, 44 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 
4, 17 (2002) (describing German control over Jewish names); Sam Kean, What’s In a Name?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 25 (reporting that Finland will not recognize a birth if the 
parents have selected an unapproved name); Sharon LaFraniere, Your Name’s Not on Our List? Change 
It, Beijing Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2009, at A1 (describing Chinese list of acceptable 
characters to use in naming children). 
124. World of Warcraft Terms of Use, BLIZZARD ENT., http://us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/ 
legal/wow_tou.html (last updated Dec. 9, 2010). 
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only character names that impersonate others but also names that parody any 
employee or representative of EVE Online or CCP, its corporate owner.125 
Facebook, for its part, reserves the right to delete a username for any reason it 
believes to be appropriate.126 
Other environments take a broader view of naming and creativity. When 
Second Life moved to a display-name policy in late 2010, allowing residents to 
change the name that appears above their avatars as often as once per week (while 
maintaining a stable account name), it justified the change as ostensibly enhancing 
the ability of members to express themselves online. As one communication from 
Linden Lab explaining the new policy stated, the display name policy “gives you 
more freedom than ever to express your inworld identity. You can use your real 
name, a fantasy name, hyphenate with your inworld partner, promote your 
organization or inworld business name, or anything that you want other Residents 
to refer to you as.”127 Whatever Linden Lab’s motivations for the change, the 
policy is particularly notable because it can be read as elevating, to some extent, 
creativity over accountability. Although residents’ account names remain 
unchanged (and thus serve as an accountability backstop), the fact that the avatar 
known to others under one display name one week may appear under a different 
display name the next week means that residents can more easily abandon poor 
reputational accumulations and start anew.128 
When Google introduced its social network, Google Plus, in 2011, it took a 
different approach, requiring participants to use their real names when registering, 
ostensibly to prevent misuse of the service.129 This policy could not, of course, be 
 
125. EVE Online Policy, supra note 121. 
126. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/ 
terms (last updated June 8, 2012) [hereinafter Facebook Statement of Rights]. 
127. Linden, supra note 122; see also Usernames and Display Names, SECOND LIFE, 
http://community.secondlife.com/t5/English-Knowledge-Base/Display-names-FAQ/ta-p/700173 (last 
updated Jan. 24, 2012). For a view that the display-names policy has not worked as intended, see 
Korman, supra note 123. 
128. This is not an unusual practice, of course, for either individuals or corporations. See 
Heymann, supra note 30, at 440–42 (discussing companies and individuals that have changed their 
names in order to get a fresh start). 
129. See User Content and Conduct Policy, GOOGLE+, http://www.google.com/intl/en-US/+/ 
policy/content.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Google Plus Policy] (“To help fight spam 
and prevent fake profiles, use the name your friends, family or co-workers usually call you. For 
example, if your full legal name is Charles Jones Jr. but you normally use Chuck Jones or Junior Jones, 
either of those would be acceptable.”). Facebook also requires most users to use their real names on 
the service, although it announced in February 2012 that it would allow some users to display well-
known pseudonyms (such as performers’ stage names) on their pages. See Facebook Statement of Rights, 
supra note 126 (prohibiting users from providing “any false personal information” or “creat[ing] more 
than one personal account”); Somini Sengupta, Letting Gaga Be Gaga: Facebook Policy Now Allows  
Made-Up Names, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at B6. As with Google Plus, the service’s view of what 
constitutes a real name may differ from the views of the site’s members. See Somini Sengupta, Naming 
Names: Rushdie Wins Facebook Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2011, at A1 (describing how Facebook 
deactivated the writer Salman Rushdie’s account, asked for proof of identity, and then reinstated the 
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truly justified on accountability grounds, since Google did not require verification 
of one’s government-recognized identity for any username. Hence, in practice, the 
policy operated as a constraint on naming creativity by prohibiting only usernames 
that failed to resemble what Google defined as a real name. Thus, “Jonathan 
Anderson” would presumably be an acceptable username on Google Plus, even if 
it were not the birth name of the user, while “Angry Farmer” and “Zyzx” (and, 
perhaps, real names in non-English languages) presumably would not. Notably, 
celebrities were permitted to register pseudonyms that would not be considered 
real names in the offline world, such as 50 Cent and Lady Gaga, whereas the well-
known pseudonyms of other users were prohibited.130 Google’s policy defined an 
acceptable name as “the name your friends, family or co-workers usually call 
you,”131 but that, of course, raised the question of which communities the policy 
deemed relevant. An individual might be called Jennifer at the office, J.J. by her 
family, Speedy by her softball teammates, and Moonglow by her friends in Second 
Life, with each of these names considered to be her usual or real name in each 
context.132 
Google’s policy engendered considerable controversy, with users and 
commentators criticizing the company for not letting users choose the names they 
would use to represent themselves on the service.133 While this opposition was 
motivated by a belief in the importance of pseudonymity in furthering individual 
engagement and communication, it is also clear that a desire for pseudonymity or 
the disaggregation of one’s offline and online identities was not the whole story. If 
pseudonymity alone had been the interest, users might have been satisfied with a 
policy that assigned each user a name to be used consistently while on the service 
or an online service in which participants were designated by number instead of by 
name. Rather, members exhibited a strong desire to create their own usernames 
online—or to be able to use a previously created name in a new environment—a 
desire likely resulting from the same kinds of creativity impulses that motivate 
larger acts of creativity: self-expression, communication, and ownership.134 
 
account under the name Ahmed Rushdie, the name on Rushdie’s passport). 
130. See Ryan Tate, Names Banned by Google Plus, GAWKER (July 25, 2011, 7:15 PM), 
http://gawker.com/5824622/names-banned-by-google-plus. 
131. See Google Plus Policy, supra note 129. 
132. Similarly, one might imagine, for example, that many people would give the name of the 
forty-second president of the United States as “Bill Clinton,” even though his “real” name is William 
Jefferson Clinton. 
133. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, Google+ Identity Crisis: What’s at Stake with Real Names and Privacy, 
WIRED (July 26, 2011, 3:48 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/07/google-plus-user-names. 
The response was reminiscent of the controversy over Friendster’s deletion of fake profiles 
(“fakesters”) on the service, including profiles for Giant Squid and Homer Simpson. See Katharine 
Mieszkowski, Faking Out Friendster, SALON (Aug. 14, 2003, 4:38 PM), http://www.salon.com/2003/ 
08/14/fakesters. 
134. The online services, of course, may not share this view of ownership, although their 
policies demonstrate a recognition of names as valuable assets. See, e.g., World of Warcraft Terms of Use, 
supra note 124 (providing that all character names are owned by Blizzard or its licensors). 
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B. Naming and Uniqueness 
Even if an online community gives its members wide latitude to create a 
username, the degree of property-like status given to that name provides 
additional information as to how the community recognizes creativity. A 
community that prohibits members from copying others’ usernames, even in 
situations in which there is no question of impersonation or fraud, is more 
intellectual property–like than a community that allows duplication of names, as 
would occur in the offline world. As with the threshold creativity question, 
whether duplication of another’s name is seen as an offense can be determined by 
the network’s formal rules and policies or as a matter of community norms. Two 
participants who are members of the same community will understand that 
community’s norms about whether names can be copied, as well as the likely 
communicative effect of that copying. (By comparison, a film studio or record 
company, whose relationships with consumers are largely financial and 
impersonal, may have different expectations about whether its work can be copied 
and shared without compensation, regardless of attribution, than members of a 
closer-knit academic community, where uncompensated copying may be tolerated 
so long as attribution is provided.) In each of these environments, participants 
who are not members of the same community cannot resort to such understood 
norms and so must either tolerate duplication (if they even see such remote use as 
a transgression), change their own name, or attempt to resort to more formal 
means of enforcement. 
In the offline world, we see varying levels of tolerance for duplication in 
naming, even in instances in which fraud or deception is not at issue. Graffiti 
artists react strongly to tag duplication because of a fierce adherence to the belief 
that one’s name represents one’s identity. As Susan Stewart has reported, “One of 
the principal rules of the writer’s code of ethics is that the writer cannot copy, or 
‘bite,’ either the tag or the style of another writer without instigating a cross-out 
war, or, more directly, a first-person fight.”135 Under the rules of the Jockey Club, 
which approves the name of each racehorse in the United States, names can be 
duplicated only if the first horse is over ten years old and the name has not been 
used during the preceding five years for breeding or for racing; “permanent 
names” (such as those of horses in the Hall of Fame) can never be used for 
another horse.136 (By contrast, the American Kennel Club permits thirty-seven 
 
135. SUSAN STEWART, CRIMES OF WRITING: PROBLEMS IN THE CONTAINMENT OF 
REPRESENTATION 213 (1991). 
136. This rule might be partially explained by the desire to avoid confusion among those 
engaging in wagering on horse racing, although note that even names of horses never used for 
breeding or racing cannot be duplicated until five years from the date of the horse’s death. See 
JOCKEY CLUB, THE AMERICAN STUD BOOK: PRINCIPAL RULES AND REQUIREMENTS 16–19 (2011), 
available at http://www.jockeyclub.com/registry.asp?section=3; see also T.D. Thornton, Aw, Nuts:  
Why You Can’t Give Your Thoroughbred an Obscene Name, SLATE (Sept. 26, 2007, 12:51 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2007/09/aw_nuts.html. 
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dogs of each breed to be given the same name; it reserves the right to assign 
Roman numerals for identification purposes.137) And as David Fagundes has 
described, U.S. roller derby participants maintain a “Master Roster” that ensures 
that derby names will not be duplicated without permission, even if the two 
skaters compete in distant leagues and are unlikely ever to come in contact with 
one another.138 In all of these instances, duplication seems to be prohibited not 
out of a desire to avoid confusion or deception (although that might be an 
alternative justification) but rather to express the community’s belief that naming 
is a creative act, the benefits of which—including receiving credit for having 
invented the name—should be enjoyed only by the name’s first author. 
In the online world of social networks and other communities, many of the 
same interests are relevant. The risk of impersonation is, of course, a major 
concern, as are more functional interests, such as the need to have messages 
forwarded to the correct participant or the desire to be able to use the same name 
across several platforms.139 Attributional problems can also be significant in any 
system that does not involve unique identifiers and does not provide functionality 
to allow speakers to indicate context. For example, whereas in an offline 
conversation one can address Bob simply by speaking his name and looking in his 
direction (or by using Bob’s last name if there is more than one Bob in the 
vicinity), an attributional reference on Twitter (using the “@” convention) has to 
refer to only one user in order for the reference to be meaningful.140 On the other 
hand, disallowing duplication may frustrate some users from participating in the 
community at all. As one writer has suggested, “[v]irtual worlds with large 
numbers of players rapidly run out of decent names.”141 
Regardless of these functional requirements, many online communities have 
developed rules or norms that prohibit name duplication based on the view that 
name creation is an expressive act that warrants recognition as an act of 
authorship. An early study of the hacker community, for example, concluded that 
“one of the greatest taboos is to use the handle of another or to use multiple 
handles.”142 The same was true in early multi-user dungeons (MUDs).143 In 
 
137. Naming of Dogs, AM. KENNEL CLUB, http://www.akc.org/reg/namingofdog.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
138. Fagundes, supra note 21 at 1109, 1116 (describing annoyance among derby participants 
when others are discovered to be using a name similar to theirs or to one they had been planning to 
use). 
139. See, e.g., Milton L. Mueller et al., Digital Identity: How Users Value the Attributes of Online 
Identifiers, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 405 (2006) (concluding, based on a survey of South Korean users, 
that consumers value the ability to use the same online identifier across multiple sites). 
140. See James Grimmelmann, First-Class Objects, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 421, 425 
(2011) (describing use of Twitter references). 
141. BARTLE, supra note 112, at 178; see also CASTRONOVA, supra note 113, at 32–33 
(discussing a hypothetical example of the many names a new user might attempt to register, only to 
find that they have already been taken by other users). 
142. Meyer & Thomas, supra note 116, at 23. 
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Internet Relay Chat (IRC), a protocol for real-time Internet communication, 
duplication of names (“nicks”) was not allowed, initially as a matter of technology 
and then later as a matter of informal norms.144 As Haya Bechar-Israeli describes, 
participants would help police the environment, informing other users that they 
were duplicating a nick and engaging in discussions to determine the senior 
user.145 If informal dispute resolution was not successful, and a nick was deemed 
stolen, participants would “sanction the thief, . . . prevent his entry into certain 
channels, and . . . send him several nasty messages.”146 Pavel Curtis, the creator of 
LambdaMOO, noted that, in that environment, “[p]layers can be possessive about 
their names, resenting others who choose names that are similarly spelled or 
pronounced or even that are taken from the same mythology or work of literature. 
In one case, for example, a player named ‘ZigZag’ complained to [him] about 
other players taking the names ‘ZigZag!’ and ‘Zig.’”147 Other researchers have 
noted the same tendencies in other virtual worlds, describing the duplication of 
usernames not in terms of impersonation or fraud, but in language connoting a 
violation of a property or personality interest.148 
One of the differences between online communities and offline communities 
is that online communities can more easily use architectural (i.e., code-based) 
means to police the norms regarding name duplication, including by establishing 
registries or other means of notifying users of claims to particular names.149 The 
woman who does not want her sister-in-law to “steal” her baby name must rely 
only on familial bonds to prevent duplication and can engage only in soft 
punishment after the fact to express her disapproval. The roller derby world 
documented by David Fagundes requires concentration of the policing authority 
in those who maintain the Master Roster. But online worlds can build in 
technology that prevents one user from duplicating the name of another. The 
registration process is an obvious place for this to happen, in that registration of a 
new user can be blocked until she has chosen a username that is not yet in use. In 
more decentralized environments, technology can be developed that allows users 
to police for duplication themselves. For example, many IRC networks once 
offered NickServ, a program that allowed users, once they had registered their 
 
143. Pavel Curtis, Mudding: Social Phenomena in Text-Based Virtual Realities, in CULTURE OF THE 
INTERNET 121, 124 (Sara Kiesler ed., 1997). 
144. Bechar-Israeli, supra note 52. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Curtis, supra note 143, at 121, 127. 
148. See, e.g., T.L. Taylor, Living Digitally: Embodiment in Virtual Worlds, in THE SOCIAL LIFE OF 
AVATARS: PRESENCE AND INTERACTION IN SHARED VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 40, 52 (R. 
Schroeder ed., 2002) (“Instances where users attempt to exactly copy another’s avatar (or use a slight 
variation on their name) is [sic] generally taken as an offense.”). 
149. On the use of architecture as “law” more generally, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND 
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
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nicknames, to boot off the service any other user they subsequently discovered 
using the same name on the network.150 
Linden Lab, unlike the developers of these other communities, made the 
decision when introducing Second Life’s display name feature in 2010 that 
duplication of display names would be permitted, as in real life, assuming that 
duplication was not for a fraudulent purpose.151 As with the move to display 
names, Linden Lab justified this policy choice as a means of allowing residents 
greater opportunities for self-expression: 
The Display Names project is about the freedom to express yourselves 
inworld—including using the tag above your head. As people live out 
their Second Lives their needs for the name above their head may 
change—perhaps they meet someone and fall in love, or they make a new 
professional affiliation or decide to roleplay. This is why an important 
principle behind this change is that Display Names not be unique or 
limited.152 
For some, this kind of creativity may come at a potential cost. As noted 
earlier, unique and persistent online pseudonyms enable accountability. Thus, it is 
not necessary that residents know the real name of the Second Life resident 
participating under the display name “Torley amplifies YOUR awesome” to be 
able to use that name as a reputational hook, just as it is not necessary for 
consumers to know that the Kimberly-Clark company makes Huggies diapers in 
order to use the HUGGIES trademark as a shorthand for the collection of 
qualities associated with the product.153 Once duplication of display names is 
permitted, it becomes more difficult to know with whom one is interacting 
(particularly if contextual clues, such as avatar appearance, have also changed) and 
whether the information one has accumulated with respect to that name remains 
relevant.154 
 
150. Wilmer van der Gaast, Register with NickServ, HACKS, http://oreilly.com/pub/h/1940 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012) (describing process); NickServ Help Page, TECHNERD, http://www. 
technerd.net/nickserv.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
151. See Linden, supra note 122 (noting that display names are “not meant to be unique 
identifiers”). Other virtual worlds have chosen differently. See What’s in a Name?, HABBO (Apr. 12, 
2010), http://www.habbo.com/articles/1590-whats-in-a-name (noting that duplication of usernames 
in Habbo Hotel would not be permitted after the site’s relaunch and that priority in case of conflict 
would go to more active users). 
152. Jack Linden, Changes to Display Names Based on Your Feedback, SECOND LIFE, (Sept. 13, 
2010, 8:14 PM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/Featured-News/Changes-to-Display-Names-
Based-on-Your-Feedback/ba-p/664881. 
153. In trademark law, this is referred to as the anonymous source doctrine. 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 85, § 3:9. 
154. See, e.g., Avril Korman, Second Life Tinfoil Hat Theory, Part 4: Who Do You Want to Be Today?, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Oct. 30, 2010), http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2064320/ 
Second-Life-Tinfoil-Hat-Theory-Part-4-Who-Do-You-Want-to-be-Today; Amity Slade, Comment to 
Soon You Arnt [sic] Unique Anymore, Someone Can Steal Your Name!, SECOND LIFE (Sept. 1, 2010,  
12:54 PM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/General-Discussions/Soon-you-arnt-unique-
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Like the hypothetical letter writer with which this Article opens, however, 
some Second Life residents opposed the display name policy, not on the grounds 
that it would cause confusion among residents, but on the grounds that it 
insufficiently respected the creativity and authorship interests involved in naming 
oneself. Commentators highlighted the way in which uniqueness in naming was 
tied to identity and (in language reminiscent of trademark anti-dilution law) the 
dilutive power of name duplication.155 Although they expressed concern about 
impersonation, they characterized the mere adoption of the name by another 
resident as an offense, much like the offline cultural groups discussed earlier.156 As 
one resident commenting on the display name policy put it: 
  First, each of us is already unique[.] I have [a Second Life] name, Di 
Falconer. I am currently the only “Di Falconer” in SL. In that way I am 
unique. More so than in [real life] where my name is “owned” by other 
people. 
  Second, I had an incredible amount of choice in selecting my first 
name, and quite a few options in selecting my second. As did everyone 
else. More so than in [real life] where my name was issued to me by my 
parents long before I even understood the concept of naming (or 
identifying, or uniqueness). I could have chosen “xyz2345x” but I chose 
“Di.” I could have selected something other than “Falconer”. Regardless, 
as “Di Falconer” or[,] had I so decided, as “xyz2345x Gumby” I am (and 
we all are) unique. Soon though, I will no longer be unique.157 
CONCLUSION 
Much has been written on the problems and benefits of pseudonymity on 
the Internet from a masking perspective: the idea that pseudonymity allows 
participants to experiment with new identities or forms of speech, to participate in 
 
anymore-someone-can-steal-your-name/td-p/341626/page/4 (“Second Life isn’t divided by 
geography like that. You can get anywhere and talk to anyone instantly. If you tell someone, you 
ought to go meet Jane Smith, there is no way that someone is going to be able to find that particular 
Jane Smith in Second Life.”). 
155. See, e.g., Darien Caldwell, Comment to Soon You Arnt [sic] Unique Anymore, Someone Can 
Steal Your Name!, SECOND LIFE (Sept. 1, 2010, 8:04 AM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/ 
General-Discussions/Soon-you-arnt-unique-anymore-someone-can-steal-your-name/td-p/341626 (“I 
can only feel that [Linden Lab] is allowing people to clone other people’s unique names in a hope to 
dilute the power of people’s unique identity. As Darien Caldwell, I am a unique individual with a 
voice. As just another Darien Caldwell in a vast sea of Darien Caldwells, my voice is lost.”). 
156. See, e.g., Daniel Regenbogen, Comment to It’s All in a Name: Display Names in Second Life, 
DUSAN WRITER’S METAVERSE (Aug. 19, 2010), http://dusanwriter.com/index.php/2010/08/18/ 
its-all-in-a-name-display-names-in-second-life (“Display names destroy identities. I know one thing 
already: anybody with a display name of ‘Daniel Regenbogen’ will be kicked out and banned from all 
groups and places that I have control over. I will not even ask for his reason to cho[o]se this display 
name—I see it as [a] very serious attack [on] me.”). 
157. Di Falconer, Comment to Changes to Display Names Based on Your Feedback, SECOND LIFE 
(Sept. 28, 2010, 6:43 AM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/Featured-News/Changes-to-
Display-Names-Based-on-Your-Feedback/ba-p/664881/page/15#comments. 
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discussions that would otherwise be problematic, to maintain a separation 
between various interests or creative efforts, or, more troubling, to maliciously 
cause harm to others without immediate detection.158 These analyses focus on the 
function of pseudonymity—in other words, pseudonymity as a means of 
accomplishing some other goal. But there is also value in recognizing 
pseudonymity as an end in itself, as a creative act of self-determination involving 
the same kinds of interests as other creative acts: authorship, personality, and 
attribution. A community’s policies and norms surrounding pseudonymity thus 
facilitate creativity in multiple ways: they allow users to say and create things they 
might not otherwise say if they were required to use their real names, and, in so 
doing, they allow users to invent and name an alternate identity, itself a matter of 
authorial creation. 
The creative effort devoted to choosing a name for oneself may well lead 
individuals to think that this creation leads to a soft, if not a formal, type of 
property right, made even more robust when the name is self-referential. Naming 
practices are thus another example of how the assumptions at the heart of our 
intellectual property doctrines may not always map very well onto the interests 
that motivate many individuals. For these individuals, the process of naming—
whether oneself or another—is a significantly expressive activity, and the use of 
that name by another gives rise to the same kinds of interests that motivate at least 
some creators working on a larger scale: harm to the emotional investment in a 
creative work, concerns about authorial recognition, and resistance to copying of 
that work. But because one can more easily tell a story about these latter creators 
that involves economic interests, neither copyright law nor trademark law has 
been required to take much notice of the fact that creativity also takes place in 
realms (like naming) where we can be reasonably certain that economics are not a 
motivating factor but that identity, reputation, and personality are. 
The dynamic nature of social networks and other online communities means 
that such communities are particularly well positioned to think seriously about 
how to respond to these noneconomic interests. In the same vein, we might 
benefit from observing the many challenges in effective implementation. For 
example, although commentators have recognized the pervasive interest in 
attribution for one’s creative efforts, they have also acknowledged the difficulty of 
constructing an attribution requirement in practice.159 One cannot easily, for 
example, allow copying of names but require that credit be given to the individual 
who came up with the name first. Likewise, we might learn from online and other 
communities about whether and how intellectual property law should respond 
 
158. See generally THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET, supra note 62 (collecting essays presenting 
various views). 
159. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 62, at 803. 
UCILR V2I2 Assembled v4 (Do Not Delete) 7/14/2012  2:14 PM 
624 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:585 
 
when community norms are absent, disparate, or not robust.160 French chefs, 
stand-up comics, and roller derby skaters are all part of small enough communities 
that they can rely on community norms and rules to vindicate creativity and 
attribution interests.161 In other words, although U.S. copyright is ostensibly about 
economic interests, and not moral rights, the stories from communities that 
protect creative products without intellectual property law suggest a tendency to 
imbed a measure of respect for the creative process into their extralegal 
enforcement norms that is necessary for such norms to function. Larger or more 
disparate communities or social networks, on the other hand, may not be as 
cohesive and thus might require more formal recognition and enforcement of 
such interests.162 Additionally, we might also look to the benefits conferred by 
official registries such as roller derby’s Master Roster and the registration 
processes of online environments that require uniqueness in naming for parallels 
to the scholarly inquiry into whether returning to a system of copyright formalities 
would be beneficial.163 These benefits might include not only the notice function 
such registries provide to others but also the psychological benefits they provide 
to creators: a way both to signify the importance of one’s creation and to have that 
creativity recognized, in some small way, by others. 
Finally, we might use the debates that have taken place over naming policies 
on Google Plus, in Second Life, and elsewhere as object lessons in whether 
intellectual property law should be normative or reactive. Should the laws and 
regulations that govern creativity, for example, reflect the norms and preferences 
that have developed over time in particular communities (and, if so, which 
communities?), or should the law impose policy choices on those subject to its 
reach?164 Are the naming constraints imposed by a particular community reflective 
 
160. ANDREW POTTER, THE AUTHENTICITY HOAX: HOW WE GET LOST FINDING 
OURSELVES 219 (2010) (“The demise of the trust economy does not mean that people stop wanting 
social goods. . . . But when we can no longer get these things through the informal barter mechanism 
of the trust economy—that is to say, from our community—we turn to more formal instruments.”); 
Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L REV. 1165, 1166 (2002) 
(noting that “private enforcement mechanisms such as gossip are unlikely to be suitable for 
geographically distant transactions if the parties are not members of the same enforcement regime, 
such as a local trade association”); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & John Crowley, Napster’s Second Life?: 
The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual Worlds, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1775, 1796 (2006) (“The experience of 
LambdaMOO and MediaMOO demonstrate that establishing a legitimate, transparent, and inclusive 
self-governing mechanism in virtual worlds is difficult.”). 
161. See sources cited supra notes 20–21. 
162. Dreyfuss, supra note 20, at 1458 (“As communities increase in size, detection costs may 
increase as well, and the efficacy of informal enforcement techniques may then decline.”); Oliar & 
Sprigman, supra note 20, at 1813 (noting that detection of joke stealing is a “community project,” in 
that it arises “when any comedian witnesses a performance of material he believes has been stolen,” 
not just the joke’s author); id. at 1862 (noting that the Internet allows audience members to become 
more involved in the discipline process). 
163. See, e.g., James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2005); 
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004). 
164. See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
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of the importance the community places on creativity, or do those constraints 
serve to bolster the perceived importance of naming as a creative act? Do these 
choices affect individuals’ attitudes or beliefs about the law as well as decisions 
about compliance or exit? As danah boyd has written: 
The “real name” culture on Facebook didn’t unfold because of the “real 
name” policy. It unfolded because the norms were set by early adopters 
and most people saw that and reacted accordingly. Likewise, the handle 
culture on MySpace unfolded because people saw what others did and 
reproduced those norms. When social dynamics are allowed to unfold 
organically, social norms are a stronger regulatory force than any 
formalized policy. At that point, you can often formalize the dominant 
social norms without too much pushback, particularly if you leave wiggle 
room. Yet, when you start with a heavy-handed regulatory policy that is 
not driven by social norms—as Google Plus did—the backlash is 
intense.165 
Individuals like the hypothetical woman whose sister-in-law “stole” her baby 
name, graffiti artists, and derby skaters are almost certainly not directly motivated 
by what the law tells them about creativity. But their feelings about what 
constitutes a creative act, what therefore becomes theirs, and what that view of 
property means for their tolerance of sharing, copying, and attribution are 
commonplace. Such feelings ought not to be vindicated legally, but they might tell 
intellectual property law something about the incentives that the law ostensibly 
exists to provide. More particularly, they might indicate that as we consider the 
terminology we use to talk about intellectual property law, we should recognize 
that at least some individuals continue to talk in terms of “theft” and “stealing” 
when their own creative efforts are at stake. 
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